

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 971

February 3, 1958

THE ROLE OF NEGOTIATION • <i>Address by Secretary Dulles</i>	159
BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT (<i>Excerpts</i>) .	169
COMMUNISM IN THE AMERICAS • <i>by Assistant Secretary Rubottom</i>	180
RADIOISOTOPES IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH • <i>Article by George G. Manov</i>	195

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Role of Negotiation

Following is the text of an address made by Secretary Dulles before the National Press Club at Washington, D. C., on January 16, together with introductory remarks by Ben Grant, president of the club, opening remarks by Mr. Dulles, and questions and answers that followed the Secretary's address.

INTRODUCTION BY MR. GRANT

If it's true, as reported, that John Foster Dulles grew up with an ambition to be Secretary of State, there must have been many times in the last 5 years when he wondered why. It's a difficult job at best, and the present Secretary never had a chance to see it at its best. Not long ago somebody wrote, "Any American boy has a chance to become President, but he also runs the risk of being appointed Secretary of State."

Right now the American Secretary of State is a subject of debate all over the world. Yesterday, in strong language, President Eisenhower made it clear once more where he stands on the Dulles issue. This much is beyond debate. Here is one of the most important men on earth. When he speaks, the whole world listens. All of us are pleased to have him speak to the world from the National Press Club.

Gentlemen, the Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles.

OPENING REMARKS BY SECRETARY DULLES

Mr. President and members of the National Press Club, I think that the last time I met here at the Press Club was in 1953, but it should not be inferred from that fact that in the interval I have avoided the press or that the press has avoided me.

Actually, I think the number of my meetings with the press—regular press conferences in the

State Department and press conferences abroad which I generally have on my travels, background press conferences at home and abroad—run the figure of my meetings with the press up to well toward 200, I would suppose. And at least it can be said that I have survived those multiple contacts although some would say that I have not survived them unscathed. But I can say this, that I am unscathed in the sense that there has been nothing that has taken place which has shaken my faith in the press, my desire to have close and intimate relations with the press, and even though we at times disagree—and indeed we sometimes do—the operation of the free press is one of the great bulwarks of our society. I welcome all of the contacts which I have had with the press and which I hope to have in the future which will occur while I am in this job.

TEXT OF ADDRESS

Press release 18 dated January 16

I shall speak first about Sputnik. The launching of an earth satellite by the Soviets may mark a decisive turn in the worldwide struggle between Communist imperialism and the free world.

No doubt the Communist rulers gained a success. They have an opportunity to gloat, an opportunity that they have not neglected. But Sputnik, mocking the American people with its "beep-beep," may go down in history as Mr. Khrushchev's boomerang.

It jolted the American people and produced a reaction which was healthy, the kind of reaction that has, in the past, served freedom well. A wave of mortification, anger, and fresh determination swept the country. Out of that mood is coming a more serious appraisal of the struggle in which we are engaged and an increasing willingness to make the kind of efforts and sacrifices needed to win that struggle.

It is, of course, essential that our Nation should react in the right ways. If we act like a bull in the arena which puts down its head and blindly charges the matador's red cape, that could be our undoing. Our response must be a "heads up" not a "heads down" response. We must see clearly and think straight. We must appraise accurately the strength of our adversary and also his weaknesses. We must design our own strategy to parry his strength and to exploit his weaknesses.

Elements of Strength in Communist Imperialism

Communist imperialism has elements of strength that make it formidable.

The rulers have an iron grip upon the people—nearly one billion of them—and subject them to a harsh discipline of work and sacrifice. Thus they abstract vast sums for military establishments and for implementing political-economic offensives.

The directing forces of Communist imperialism have from the beginning seen the struggle as a long one, lasting, as Lenin and Stalin used to put it, "for an entire historical era." Accordingly, they have engaged in long-range planning and have not relied upon quick successes, as has been the undoing of so many militaristic dictators. This planning now shows results in a large and ever-growing corps of scientists and technicians who, as a special privileged class, serve the state and party at home and abroad.

At home they have enabled the Soviets to develop a military establishment equipped with the most modern weapons, both conventional and nuclear. It must, I think, be conceded that the Soviets, by concentrating on missiles for the past 12 years, have been more imaginative and more daring than we have been over the same period.

The steady buildup of Soviet industrial power now makes it possible for the Soviet bloc to conduct economic warfare to gain control of newly independent and newly developing countries. It loans large sums as "aid" and makes attractive "barter" deals whereby it absorbs raw materials in exchange for its manufactured products.

Communist propaganda is highly developed and particularly effective. Its effectiveness is at least superficially augmented by the fact that those who direct the Communist propaganda feel no obligation to speak the truth or to tell in one

part of the world the same story that they tell in another.

Communist Weaknesses

The assets of Communist imperialism are surely formidable. But there is no reason for us to be discouraged or to think that those assets enable it to dominate the world. Communist imperialism has its weakness as well as its strength. For example:

(1) Even the most potent despotism is bound to pay some attention to the mounting demands of the people for more consumers goods. The spectacular shifts which have occurred in Soviet leadership over the last 5 years are not merely personal struggles for power but struggles between the adherents of different policies. We need not exclude the possibility of there coming into power those who will primarily seek the welfare of the Soviet people and not continue to keep them impaled on the sickle of Communist imperialism.

(2) Minds that are fine enough to deal with modern scientific and technical problems cannot be kept from coming to independent conclusions about other matters. The growth within the Soviet Union of a new intelligentsia is bound to affect Soviet policies.

(3) The leaders of the newly independent countries seek jealously to safeguard their independence. They know that there are hundreds of millions within the Sino-Soviet bloc who desperately need better living conditions and that consequently the Communist rulers would not deny betterment at home and confer it abroad except to make major political gains. Therefore the governments of the newly independent countries are wary and look for safe alternatives to Communist aid and trade.

(4) Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Soviet position is that it does not seem able to disengage itself from the partition of Germany and the suppression of the independence of the nations of Eastern Europe.

United States Policies

I now speak of United States policies. They are compounded of confidence plus realization of how formidable are the resources of those who seek world domination.

United States peaceful policies, coordinated with the policies of dependable allies, have both a defensive and an affirmative character.

(1) We will maintain a strong, balanced military posture, including enough ever-present and ever-alert retaliatory power to deter Soviet aggression. The President's state of the Union message¹ made clear that need. There seems little doubt that the Congress will respond.

(2) We propose to counter the economic threat. It will be harder for us to get the resources to do that. But unless we wage successfully the political-economic war that is now being fought, Communist imperialism can win without ever a gun being fired. It is vital that the newly independent and newly developing countries should find in freedom the way to lift up their own people. It is vital that the United States continue to be a dependable market where other free-world nations can sell what they produce and buy what they need. Without assurances in these two respects, Communist imperialism would gain control of many lands with their human, material, and strategic values; and in the end our own economy would be strangled by lack of the exports and imports which are essential to our economic health.

(3) We must see to it that our freedom is a dynamic force. That is not just a task of government but even more of our free citizenry.

Today there is a challenge to liberty more formidable than any in recent times. Powerful men are fanatically teaching that human diversity and human dignity are false ideals and that human needs can best be satisfied by a materialistic, atheistic society which imposes conformity and treats human beings as cogs in a great economic machine.

In the face of that challenge our own society is closely observed. We are widely regarded as the principal exponents of freedom and as leaders of the free world. Many are trying to judge whether this freedom of ours is really a product they want to import. It is up to us to make our freedom so rich, so dynamic, so self-disciplined that its values will be beyond dispute and its influence become so penetrating as to shorten the life expectancy of Communist imperialism.

President Eisenhower, in his last month's speech at NATO,² said that "there is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples." That strategy can be, and I am confident will be, implemented by such policies as I describe.

The Place for Negotiation

Given the intensive nature of the present struggle, what place is there for negotiation? First of all, let me say emphatically that there *is* a place for negotiation. Negotiation is one of the major tools of diplomacy. It would be the height of folly to renounce the use of this tool. This administration has not done that in the past and does not intend to do it for the future.

We must, on the basis of past experience, assume that negotiation with the Communists, if it is to bring acceptable results, will be a long, hard task. I have often engaged in that work and have spent many days personally participating in high-level face-to-face negotiations with the Soviets. I have had considerable education as to their methods.

Whenever negotiations involve matters of real substance, the Communists go at them in a tough, hard way. They are highly legalistic and seek to devise hidden loopholes through which they can subsequently escape from what seem to be their obligations. They practice inexhaustible patience, withholding what they may be prepared to give until the last moment in the hope that they can get what they want without giving as much as they are ready to give. They astutely take into account any weaknesses of their opponents such as impatience to get the negotiation over or willingness to treat any "agreement" as a success, without regard to the contents or dependability. Furthermore, the scope of possible agreement is limited by the fact that the Communist record of performance is so poor that never ought the United States rely on any promises by the Communists which depend merely upon future good faith.

The negotiations which ended the Korean fighting took 2 years and involved 575 meetings. Many of the armistice provisions were quickly violated by the Communist side, but the essen-

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 115.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

tial—the abstention from warfare—has stuck, because it was in the mutual interest.

The negotiations for the state treaty which gave Austria her liberty took approximately 8 years and involved some 400 meetings. This treaty has been lived up to by the Communist side.

The negotiations for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which were finally concluded in 1956, took almost 3 years.

The negotiations with the Soviet Union for “cultural contacts” upon which we are now engaged here at Washington began 2½ years ago at the Geneva Summit Conference.

Our negotiations at Geneva with the Chinese Communists have been going on for over 2 years. We got an agreement for the release of the American civilian captives. But that agreement remains partially dishonored.

I do not suggest that negotiations must be so prolonged. With good will there is no need that they be so prolonged. But always, the past record is, if the negotiations involved real matters of substance, the Communists have proceeded very carefully and with a design to gain every possible advantage.

I believe that there should be, and will be, further negotiations with the Soviet Union. There are many areas where there could be dependable agreement in the common interest. Also I believe that the Soviet rulers, and I know that we, do not want our two nations to drift so far apart that there is increased danger that the cold war will turn into a hot war.

President Eisenhower, in his reply of last Monday to Chairman Bulganin,² took a major step looking to what could be further negotiations and agreements of exceptional importance.

He proposed strengthening the United Nations by reducing the use of the veto power.

He proposed proceeding with the reunification of Germany as agreed at Geneva in 1955.

He proposed considering how to give the peoples of Eastern Europe their promised, and long overdue, opportunity to have governments of their own choosing.

In the field of armament he advanced the most significant proposal that could be made at this time to assure human survival, namely, that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

It is unhappily too late now to assure fully what the United States proposed in 1947—that all fissionable material should be used only for peaceful purposes—although we still can, and should, do that for newly produced fissionable material. But it *is* possible now to assure that outer space—all of it—should be dedicated to peace and not to war. I might add at this point that we have been much interested in the suggestions made by Senator Lyndon Johnson in this field.

And finally President Eisenhower proposed that, since ability to supervise fulfillment of agreements is at the heart of all armament proposals, joint technical study groups should be established at once to explore the technical problems involved in supervision. He said that, so far as we were concerned, this could be done without any prior Soviet acceptance of any disarmament proposal. It could also be done without any Soviet commitment to the possible interdependence of the various proposals.

President Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Bulganin should dissipate once and for all any impression that the United States does not want to negotiate or is afraid to negotiate with the Soviet rulers. The truth is quite the contrary. We do want a summit meeting, provided the proper conditions obtain. We do not however want a summit meeting which merely represents another episode in the cold war and which would be held under circumstances that would carry great peril to the free world.

There are, I know, many who feel that the cold war could be ended and the need for sacrificial effort removed by the stroke of a pen at the summit. That is the kind of illusion that has plagued mankind for a long time. Actually, peace is never achieved in that way, and there could be no greater folly for us than to act on the belief that all our danger could be ended by peaceful platitudes proclaimed from the summit by Heads of Government.

The expansionist goals of the Communist Parties and the exploitation of the subject peoples for military and economic aggressive purposes will not be altered by one iota by generalities uttered at a summit conference. But with the free peoples it is different. Their governments cannot make the necessary efforts except as the people themselves feel the need to work and sacrifice for the security of their nations and of their

ideals. A summit conference which diverted the free nations from doing what is necessary for their security, without any comparable change in the Sino-Soviet bloc, could be a great, indeed a fatal, disaster.

Equally, it could be a disaster if the free-world leaders at such a conference felt that, to avoid the danger inherent in a platitudinous declaration of peace, they had to go to the other extreme and break off in an atmosphere of hostility. That could intensify the cold war and make more likely that it would turn into a hot war.

For these reasons it is essential, as President Eisenhower pointed out and as Mr. Khrushchev once himself agreed, that any summit meeting should be well prepared. There should be assurance that significant topics will be discussed and that there is a good prospect of arriving at significant agreements which will be fulfilled.

The way to such a meeting was clearly pointed out by President Eisenhower in his last week's message to Chairman Bulganin. It is now for the Soviet rulers to make clear whether or not *they* want a summit conference which will genuinely promote the cause of peace and justice in the world. We do.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Press release 19 dated January 16

Q. Somebody asked: A congressional committee quoted you as saying there was nothing wrong with the Yalta agreement except that the Russians broke it. Is this your view?

SECRETARY DULLES: I would say that the last half of what I said is at least correct. (Laughter) The Russians broke it.

Q. What does Khrushchev hope to gain from a summit conference?

A. I hope that the remarks I already made throw light on what are probably, I fear, his intentions, although those intentions will be tested by what goes on in the coming weeks and months. But the great gain, as I pointed out, that they could get—and which certainly they will try to get if we let them—the great gain is to have a meeting which, as I say, will utter platitudes about peace—“we are going to work together, we are all going to be friends, we are going to end

all world tensions”—with the implication that there is no need any more to have this military preparation, to pay taxes in order to have a mutual security program, and the like. If Khrushchev can get that, that would be the greatest triumph of his career or indeed the career of almost anyone, because then we would come back here and the other free-world leaders would go back to countries where the people would no longer be willing to support the military programs, the economic assistance programs, the inconveniences of alliances which require people to coordinate their policies with each other. All those things, it would be believed, could be thrown away because peace has been proclaimed. But the Communist Parties will go right on.

One point that always needs to be borne in mind is that, when you negotiate with the leaders of Communist-controlled states, you are not negotiating with the principals; you're negotiating with the second-class people, because the governments of these countries are all run by the Communist Party and, unless you bind that party, you haven't got an agreement which, as to broad policy, has any significance at all. I recall very well the Litvinov agreement, which we made at the time when we recognized the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government agreed that it would not tolerate the establishment on its soil of any group which was seeking to carry on subversive activities in the United States. Of course the subversive activities went on just the same, indeed were intensified. And we asked the Soviets “how come,” and they said, “Oh, those are being carried on by the party. The state is not carrying those on. Therefore, what we are doing is entirely consistent with our agreement.” That is the kind of thing you are up against.

Question of Summit Conference

Q. Mr. Secretary, that leads to another question, which says: What can be accomplished at a summit conference that can't be accomplished at a lower-level conference?

A. I think that it is essential that at a lower-level conference or through diplomatic channels, which are equally, perhaps even more, useful in this connection, it be found out, as I said, whether there can be a possibility of agreement on significant matters in ways which will assure perform-

ance. Now, sometimes in the course of these negotiations everything seems to be settled except one or two points, and the element of decision on these points is, of course, made by the Heads of State. And if there is going to be a worthwhile agreement, it may be useful to have it sanctified somewhat by a meeting of the Heads of Government. I won't say that there is inherently any possibility in a Heads of Government meeting that is not equally present in the diplomatic intercourse or meetings at a lower level, foreign ministers and the like. You have a choice of a whole lot of methods, and it's impossible to say that you can achieve something by one method that you can't achieve by the other. They are different means that are employed. Sometimes it may be that a Heads of Government meeting is useful, although I would not say there is any inherent reason why you cannot also work at a lower level, because actually, of course, the Heads of Government direct what goes on. If negotiations are conducted through diplomacy, President Eisenhower has just as much a part in that as he would have if he were personally meeting with Chairman Bulganin. It's just a question of variety, choice, and I would not think there was inherently any advantage in one as against another.

Q. Somebody asks: Isn't a summit conference worth while if only from the viewpoint of psychological warfare, that is, its impact on the public opinion of neutral countries?

A. I suppose that a meeting of Heads of Government has a certain psychological advantage in the sense that it is probably interpreted, at least, as indicative of a greater desire, a greater effort to get together. And perhaps in that sense, I think, undoubtedly in that sense, there is a certain magic that seems to attach to it in the minds of many people, particularly in the noncommitted countries. That is one of the advantages.

Of course, there are other serious disadvantages of the kind I pointed out. When you get the Heads of Government together, you have either got to come out with something or have a break. And it puts a terrific pressure on the Heads of Government to do what may be improvident just to avoid the alternative of seeming to have a break. And that is the reason why, in my opinion, they ought not to put themselves in that position until it is pretty sure that some worthwhile agreement can be arrived at.

Q. Will the United States insist that the problem of German unification be at least fully discussed at any future summit meeting, even if chances for real progress are dim?

A. I can't conceive of there being another summit meeting which regarded as entirely washed out the agreements and decisions taken at the last summit conference. If that is going to happen, it would be much better not to have the conference at all, in my opinion. As the President pointed out in his letter to Chairman Bulganin, the one agreement that was arrived at and expressed in terms of an agreement, and the only one, related to Germany. And if another summit conference is to be held and not even discuss the one subject that was agreed on at the last summit meeting and treat that as washed up, then I think that of itself showed that a subsequent meeting was a mistake. If we treat agreements at the summit as of no future significance, and their only purpose is to have a meeting to seem to agree, have the agreement violated, and then start another meeting on another topic, I can't imagine a worse course of procedure or one that would be more disastrous.

Q. You say the free nations must not modify their security precautions without any comparable change in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Do you envisage meeting the Chinese Communists at the summit?

A. I do not think there is any occasion at the present time to meet with the Chinese Communists at the summit. The problems that demand treatment are not primarily problems where the Chinese Communists are indispensable parties or indeed, in my opinion, proper parties. Now, of course, I say this: If peace can be really gained by meeting with the Chinese Communists, we don't let the fact that we don't recognize them stand in the way. We met with the Chinese Communists at the foreign-ministers level at Geneva in 1954, I think it was. We have been meeting with them at the ambassadorial level at Geneva for the past 2 years and more. We dealt with them at the Korean armistice negotiations.

The policy of nonrecognition has no necessary relationship at all as to willingness to meet to accomplish results. But I cannot see the likelihood that any question would now come up for

discussion where they would be, in the words of President Eisenhower, one of the nations having a recognized responsibility in relation to the subject matter.

Q. Also on the subject of Communist China, what are the objectives of our present policy toward Communist China, and do you feel a new approach might be wise?

A. The objectives of our policy toward Communist China are the same as our objectives in respect to other aspects of our foreign policy, and that is to serve the enlightened interest of the United States. So long as the Communist regime is dedicated to opposing by all possible means the things which we believe to be in our interest, we do not see that there is any advantage to be gained by increasing its authority, its influence and prestige to be used against us. In every way—except now by open force where they are restrained by our own security treaties—in every way they are seeking to destroy the band of free nations which still exist and which keep the Pacific a body of water controlled by the free nations. They are trying to do that in an avowed spirit of hostility to the United States.

Any time it will serve the interests of the United States to recognize the Chinese Communist regime, we will do it. We are not controlled by dogma or anything of that sort. It's a very simple question: Will it serve our interests and the interests of the free world and our allies to whom we are committed to grant recognition? If the answer to that is that it will help it, then we will recognize. If the answer is that it will not help it, then we will not recognize, and the answer today is "no."

American Prestige Abroad

Q. So far as world prestige is concerned, how do you think America stands today as compared with 5 years ago?

A. I can hardly answer that question perhaps without a certain amount of bias. (Laughter) I would say, to try to be as candid as possible, that the United States stands higher than ever before with the governments of the free-world countries. I cannot say the same as regards public opinion, where I think public opinion may perhaps have been somewhat misled, but perhaps you gentlemen

have a very different view of that. The fact is, I believe, that the United States is respected more than it has ever been before. Now, there is a difference between being respected and being liked. We do not run the foreign policy of the United States with a view to winning a popularity contest. And we have to do things which we know are not going to be popular. But we have not done, in my opinion, anything for which we are not respected, and I prefer being respected to being popular.

Q. Mr. Secretary, several of our members are interested in a certain paragraph in a letter from the President which was deleted. One question said, "Who deleted the paragraph from the President's letter to Bulganin?" and somebody else said, "Do you think the portion of President Eisenhower's letter to Bulganin dealing with its wide publication in Russia should have been deleted?"

A. As the President said, the draft of his letter to Bulganin went through many, many changes and revisions. It would be almost superhuman for anyone to remember offhand what was in the last draft as against what was in the next to the last draft and what was in the draft that preceded that, and so on down through about 10 drafts. As to whether it should or should not have been deleted, there are reasons for it, some of which I would think it inadvisable to state here. But I think the way it has worked out is perfect, because far more attention now is going to be focused on whether it is going to be published than if that paragraph had been in the letter. (Laughter)

Q. If you had it to do over again, would you support England, France, and Israel in a Suez Canal dispute with Egypt?

A. I suppose the question means in a military action.

Mr. Grant: As far as I know.

A. Because, of course, we did support the position of those three governments as to their rights in relation to the Suez Canal. We always took the position that Israeli ships and cargoes were entitled to go through the canal under the Treaty of Constantinople. We also took the position that the action taken by Egypt in terminating the concession which provided for inter-

national operation of the canal, in terminating that prior to the agreed date, was an improper act. But if the question goes to whether or not we would, if we had to do it over again, have supported the military effort that was launched, I would have to say that I would not today take any action other than that which I advised to the President when it happened. I do not think that it is profitable to get into discussions as to why and wherefore. That was a very tragic affair.

As I was saying to someone who spoke to me about it just before we came in here, it was in many ways the hardest decision, I think, that the President and I ever had to take. And when I went up that night at the United Nations and went up to the rostrum, I said, "I come here with a very heavy heart," and that was a very true statement. But I have never yet in public office—and I do not think I ever shall—try to explain the reason or to defend myself for that, because I cannot do that without reopening old wounds, old controversies, which we are trying to heal and which, in my opinion, have been healed, for which I thank God.

Controlling Use of Outer Space

Q. What steps does the United States plan to achieve the President's proposal to halt work on space weapons and dedicate outer space to peaceful purposes?

A. The kind of instruments that are used now, at least, to penetrate the world atmosphere and to reach outer space are large, cumbersome, require a large array of auxiliary equipment, require long preparation, and they could not be concealed from even the most superficial form of inspection if it were from the air. Therefore, at the present stage of the art, you might say, we have something which is readily subject to being controlled. And the important thing, perhaps the vital thing, is to get into this control business while that is still the case.

I recall the fact that back in '47-'48, when the making of atomic weapons was still a process in its infancy, when we had a monopoly of the know-how, we offered to internationalize that at that time. I think perhaps never in history has as great and generous a gesture been made by a great country. The Soviets turned it down. Now the art has developed to such a point that it is almost impossible—it is, I guess, absolutely

impossible—to keep track of the fissionable material that has already been created, that may be secreted, and which cannot be accounted for. So while something can be done in this atomic field and we believe something should be done to prevent the spreading of these weapons throughout the world, increasing the piling up of these nuclear weapons, it is not possible to accomplish at this stage the great humanitarian results which could have been accomplished if the United States offer had been accepted in '47-'48.

Now we are at the opening stage of a new, great development, a development which can now readily be controlled, but we cannot say with certainty, if it goes uncontrolled for 10 years, that perhaps by that time the mechanics of penetrating outer space will have been so refined and improved upon that we will not be up against the same kind of impossibility and of great difficulty that we are at the present time with regard to nuclear weapons. So the time to move is now, in the infancy of this art of penetrating the atmosphere and reaching outer space. And, as I say, it can be done now very readily because of the fact that the mechanics of this thing at the present time are so cumbersome, so obvious, that they can readily be detected and controlled. There would, I suppose, need to be some kind of an international commission presumably, and preferably, under the auspices of the United Nations, which would have the task, perhaps comparable to the task of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has a task of assuring that the nuclear materials that it disposes of, at least, shall be used only for peaceful purposes.

Now I see no political or material obstacles in the way of establishing an effective, all-inclusive, dependable system of supervision and which would assure that, if anyone makes an instrument to use outer space, it can be detected, can be known, and it can be assured that the objects to be set up will be in the interests of science and humanity and not in the interests of war. I think there is an opportunity here which is almost staggering in its possible implications—its implications if we do it, and its tragic implications if we do not do it.

And I certainly hope from the depth of my heart that the emphasis which President Eisenhower put upon this in his letter to Chairman Bulganin will find a response. I know it is said, it will be said, that this is "sour grapes" because the Soviets

are a bit ahead of us now perhaps in this field, that we are just trying to stop them when they are ahead. Well, I think I can assure you with complete integrity that there was not a vestige of that thinking when we made this proposal. And nobody knows really, when it comes to missiles, what our relative positions are. They are ahead when it comes to satellites at the moment. But, when it comes to the missiles, the relative status of our arts is a good deal of an enigma. But whatever it may be, it can, I think, be taken as absolutely certain that the advances that will be made by both of us in this field will be such that a decade from now we will both have such a power that the question of our relative power becomes quite unimportant. Therefore, the fact that the Russians may think themselves a little bit ahead at the moment should not deter them any more than we were deterred at a time when we were well ahead of the Soviets in atomic weapons in 1947. I believe that, if they are at all sincere in their professions of peace and if, when Chairman Bulganin decried what he called the "production of ever-more-powerful weapons"—if that was a sincere utterance on his part, he will jump at this chance.

Q. Somebody asks, "What future does Harold Stassen have in the State Department?" (Laughter)

A. Mr. Stassen is a gentleman of very great ability and whom I admire. The question is, "What future does he have in the State Department?" It is quite true that he has an office in the State Department, but it is also true that he is a Special Assistant to the President, and, as I remarked once before, I think his future lies between Harold Stassen and President Eisenhower, not me.

Significance of Hungarian Revolution

Q. At the time of the Hungarian revolution one year ago you expressed the opinion that this meant the beginning of the end for Soviet Russia and world communism. With the advent of Sputnik, and so on, is this still your opinion?

A. That is my opinion. But I don't think at the time I made the remark that you referred to I put a date on when the end would be. But the most significant development I think that has occurred in recent times has been the proof given by the Hungarian people that, even though they

had been under Soviet Communist rule and, above all, indoctrination, subjected through their schools, their radio, and their press to all of the influences that communism could exert, yet, in the face of having been subjected to that for well over a decade, what was the end result? The end result was thousands upon thousands of people who were ready to die rather than continue subject to that kind of a system.

Well, as I say, when that has been demonstrated, that demonstrates that there is a fatal defect. The Communists had the opportunity—how long was it?—from '45 to '56—11 years—to teach the young people, to have their ear exclusively from that period, say from the time when they were in their early teens until the time when they were in their middle twenties. The fact was that the revolt came primarily out of the young people who never had known anything in the way of education during that decade except what they got from the Communists. If communism can't win the hearts and the minds of the people under those conditions, then I say that that is proof that it is never going to go on indefinitely ruling the people of their world.

Now they can, as they have, gain successes. And as they continue to be ruthless, they can continue this suppression. But the significant fact was that it brought to light that there is, in my opinion, a fatal defect in that system, a defect which in the end is going to lead to their undoing. Now, how quickly does that happen? I think I have always avoided trying to put a date on it. I have sometimes said a decade, or generation—phrases to indicate an indefinite time. But it is silly to try to put dates on these things. It could happen quickly, or it could be prolonged, depending on circumstances that nobody can foresee, that nobody can estimate. But that the event in Hungary demonstrated something which in the end is going to be their undoing, about that I have no doubt whatsoever.

Q. Our time has about expired, but I do want to ask you one remaining question: Do you believe that the United States Government can do much at this time to help the French solve their economic problems?

A. I think that there is no doubt but what the United States, and perhaps other countries in the European Payments Union, can help the French to solve the external aspects of their financial

problem provided they have, as I think they have or will have, an adequate program at home. The French economy is one of the most vigorous and strong economies in the world. I think I noted in my last State Department press conference⁴ that it is reported that there is the largest per capita productivity in France of any country in Europe. There is no reason at all why the French should not have a good, sound, healthy economy if they can get their house in order at home. Now because their foreign assets have been largely dissipated and because the French people have not had great confidence in their own government, there are some immediate problems that would confront them even though they now adopted the most perfect domestic program that could be conceived. I believe that France has enough friends, among whom it can count the United States, that will help the French to help themselves.

Mr. Grant: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It will be of interest to know that this is one of the largest crowds ever gathered in this room.

I want to present to you this certificate of appreciation from the National Press Club for your appearance here.

SECRETARY DULLES: Thank you. It has been very nice to be here and meet with you.

United States and Laos Reaffirm Friendly Ties

Following is the text of a joint communique released at the close of the 3-day informal visit to Washington of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos.

Press release 14 dated January 15

COMMUNIQUE

During the course of an informal visit to Washington from January 13 to 15, 1958, His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos, conferred with the President of the United States and the Secretary of State on problems of mutual interest to the two countries. These discussions were supplemented

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

by meetings between Prince Souvanna Phouma and his advisers and the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense and other American officials. From these conversations the two governments gained increased understanding on matters of common concern.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma expressed pleasure that after more than three years of division the Kingdom of Laos had been reunified through a political settlement concluded with the Pathet Lao. He pointed out that the sovereignty recognized at the Geneva Conference of July 1954 could now be exercised throughout all of Laos' territory, and that henceforth any Lao not recognizing the authority of the Royal Government would be considered a rebel and prosecuted as a common traitor to the nation.

Reaffirming Laos' membership in the Free World and its traditional friendly ties with the West, the Prime Minister declared that his Government would continue vigilant and strong in its determination to defend Laos' independence against any attempted alien domination. Prince Souvanna Phouma recognized that the Communist ideology is a danger to the Free World, and stressed that any system which throttled the dignity and freedom of the individual could have no appeal for the Lao people.

President Eisenhower confirmed the willingness of the United States to offer, within the limitations of Constitutional processes, its moral and material support to the Kingdom of Laos so long as such support could assist the Government of Laos in its effort to maintain its independence. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma declared his determination to insure that American aid would be used for the enduring benefit of the Lao people and the true national interest of the Kingdom. Experts of the two Governments will meet in Washington within a week to develop specific measures for carrying out agreement reached in principle on certain aspects of the administration of the Mutual Security program in Laos.

President Eisenhower and Prince Souvanna Phouma agreed that any aggression threatening the political independence of the Kingdom of Laos would endanger peace and stability. Both Governments reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations as the instrument of peaceful and just settlement of international disputes.

Budget Message of the President (Excerpts)¹

To the Congress of the United States:

The budget for the fiscal year 1959 which I am transmitting with this message reflects the swiftly moving character of the time in which we live. It is clearly a time of growing opportunity as technology and science almost daily open wholly new vistas to all mankind. Yet it is also a time of growing danger. The progress of the Soviets in long-range missiles and other offensive weapons, together with their continuing rejection of a workable disarmament, compels us to increase certain of our defense activities which we have only recently expanded many fold.

We know that we are sturdy today in the many strengths that keep the peace. This budget reflects our determination to remain so in the future.

This budget reflects another determination—that of adhering to those principles of governmental and fiscal soundness that have always guided this administration—economy in expenditures, efficiency in operations, promotion of growth and stability in a free-enterprise economy, a vigorous Federal-State system, concern for human well-being, priority of national security over lesser needs, revenues adequate to cover expenditures and permit debt reduction during periods of high business activity, and revision and reduction of taxes when possible.

To meet the responsibilities imposed on us by world conditions and by the fiscal principles to which we adhere, the budget for 1959 contains recommendations to provide:

(1) An immediate increase for 1958 of \$1.3 billion in spending authority for the Department of Defense, and a further increase of \$2.5 billion in 1959 over 1958, to be applied principally to

accelerate missile procurement, to strengthen our nuclear retaliatory power, and to spur military research and development programs;

(2) A resulting increase of \$2.8 billion in estimated 1959 expenditures over 1957 for missiles, nuclear armed or powered ships, atomic energy, research and development, science and education, plus a further provision of \$0.5 billion for defense purposes, if needed; in addition, authority to transfer up to \$2 billion between military appropriations, in order to take prompt advantage of new developments;

(3) A decrease of \$1.5 billion in 1959 expenditures below 1957 for other military arms and equipment and aircraft of declining importance, in favor of the newer weapons;

(4) Curtailments, revisions, or eliminations of certain present civil programs, and deferments of previously recommended new programs, in order to restrain nonmilitary spending in 1959 and to provide the basis for budgetary savings of several billion dollars annually within a few years;

(5) Continuation of present tax rates to help achieve a balanced budget in 1959.

I believe that this budget adequately provides for our Federal responsibilities in the year ahead.

The estimated budget totals for the current fiscal year and for the fiscal year 1959 are compared with actual results of earlier years in the following table:

BUDGET TOTALS
(Fiscal years. In billions)

	1956 actual	1957 actual	1958 esti- mate	1959 esti- mate
Budget receipts.....	\$68.1	\$71.0	\$72.4	\$74.4
Budget expenditures.....	66.5	69.4	72.8	73.9
Budget surplus (+) or deficit (—).....	+1.6	+1.6	— .4	+ .5
New obligational authority..	63.2	70.2	¹ 74.4	72.5

¹ Includes \$6.6 billion of anticipated supplemental requests.

¹ H. Doc. 266, 85th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Jan. 13. The message, together with summary budget statements, is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; price \$1.75.

DEFENSE, SCIENCE, AND THE BUDGET

Americans are determined to maintain our ability to deter war and to repel and decisively counter any possible attack. Today we possess military superiority over any potential aggressor or aggressors. Every American should clearly understand that the vast defense programs undertaken during the past several years have greatly advanced our military preparedness and developed and harnessed impressive new scientific achievements. We have sharply increased the numbers of scientists and engineers assigned to top priority defense programs. We have expanded many fold the expenditures for the development of missiles, both defensive and counteroffensive. We have accelerated development of advanced guidance systems, new fuels, and heat-resistant materials. We have greatly enlarged our network of warning devices and communications.

Our longer-range ballistic missile development, in particular, has long had the highest national priority. The result is striking. Whereas in 1953 we spent only \$1 million on these programs, we spent \$1 billion in 1957 and will spend more in 1958 and still more in 1959.

Our defenses are strong today, both as a deterrent to war and for use as a crushing response to any attack. Now our concern is for the future. Certain elements of our defense program have reached the point where they can be further accelerated. I will transmit to the Congress, immediately, a supplemental appropriation request of \$1.3 billion for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1958. Further increases in new obligational authority are requested for the fiscal year 1959. The recommended authority for the military functions of the Department of Defense is \$39.1 billion, which is \$0.6 billion more than was requested in last year's budget for 1958 and \$3.8 billion more than the amount the Congress has thus far enacted for 1958. Spending for military functions of the Department of Defense in 1959 is estimated to total \$39.8 billion.

The development of longer-range ballistic missiles, construction of missile sites and detection systems, and other missile programs including guided missile ships will be substantially augmented. The total expenditures for missile research, development and procurement, for guided missile ships, and for missile-related construction will be \$4.3 billion in 1958 and \$5.3 billion in

1959, compared with \$3 billion spent in 1957, \$1.7 billion in 1956, and \$1.2 billion in 1955. Commencing in 1958, we will procure a number of new missiles which have been recently developed and have now become operational.

As an indispensable part of our efforts to maintain an adequate defense, the budget recommendations for 1959 call for continued contributions to the efforts of free world nations to promote the collective defense and economic growth. The Soviet threat to freedom is far more than military power alone. Poverty and ignorance, and the despair, fear, and unrest that flow from them, have always been enemies to liberty. The Communists well know this and unceasingly exploit these factors to extend their influence and control. This Soviet economic assault on freedom is rapidly growing. Conquest by this route is no less menacing to us and other free nations than conquest by military force. We must, accordingly, vigorously advance our programs to assist other peoples in their efforts to remove poverty and ignorance. As we succeed in these military and economic efforts, our own freedom and security are strengthened, and the prospects for peace are improved.

Scientific and research efforts throughout the Nation must be expanded. This is a task not only for the Government but also for private industry, foundations, and educational institutions. The Government, on its part, will increase its efforts in this area. Supplemental appropriations for 1958 will be requested for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the National Science Foundation, as well as the Department of Defense. For 1959, new programs to promote education in science are being recommended and basic research activities are being generally expanded.

CHANGES IN EMPHASIS

Total Government expenditures (1) for all procurement to equip our forces and those of our allies with weapons, ships, planes, and missiles, (2) for atomic energy, and (3) for all scientific research and education will be approximately \$21.1 billion in 1958 and \$21.6 billion in 1959, compared with \$20.5 billion in 1957.

Within these totals for procurement and science, we have gradually but substantially changed our emphasis. This administration's

continuing attention in recent years to new concepts of defense is shown by the fact that more than 75% of the total funds for procurement in the 1959 budget and 1958 supplemental requests is programed for new types of equipment which had not been developed in the fiscal year 1955 or were not being bought in production quantities in that year—the first full year following the Korean conflict. In 1953, missiles alone took less than 2 cents of each dollar spent for major procurement; in 1957, missiles took about 15 cents of every procurement dollar; and in 1959 will take about 24 cents.

The greatly increased firepower of modern weapons and the continuing increase in efficiency permit a further reduction in the numbers of military personnel. Procurement of older types of weapons and equipment is also being reduced. Other defense expenditures will be reduced by closing installations that are outmoded or are of limited use, and by tightening maintenance standards, procurement practices, and supply management.

Analysis of Major Programs and Budgetary Issues

For purposes of summarization and discussion, budget expenditures are grouped into the categories of protection, civil benefits, interest and general government.

Expenditures for major national security and for international affairs and finance, which together make up the category of "protection," will require 64% of estimated total 1959 budget expenditures. The \$47.1 billion estimated to be spent on protection in the fiscal year 1959 is more than in any year since 1955.

An estimated 22% of budget expenditures in 1959 will be for civil benefit programs. These programs are grouped under the headings: Labor and welfare; commerce and housing; veterans services and benefits; agriculture and agricultural resources; and natural resources. The estimated \$16.4 billion to be spent on civil benefits in 1959 is \$0.6 billion less than the comparable amount for the current year.

The estimate of 1959 expenditures for interest is \$7.9 billion, the same as in 1958. Expenditures

for general government will require an estimated \$1.4 billion in 1959, also about the same as in 1958.

BUDGET EXPENDITURES AND AUTHORIZATIONS BY PURPOSE
[Fiscal years. In billions]

Purpose	Budget expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1959
	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate	
Protection.....	\$45.2	\$46.3	\$47.1	\$45.9
Civil benefits.....	15.1	17.0	16.4	16.0
Interest.....	7.3	7.9	7.9	7.9
General government.....	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.4
Allowance for proposed legislation and contingencies.....		0.2	1.1	1.3
Total.....	69.4	72.8	73.9	¹ 72.5

¹ Compares with new obligational authority of \$70.2 billion for 1957 and \$74.4 billion for 1958.

The budget also includes estimated expenditures of \$1.1 billion for the fiscal year 1959 as an allowance for proposed legislation and contingencies not included in the categories above. Within this allowance \$500 million is estimated specifically for defense contingencies, \$339 million is estimated for proposed pay adjustments for postal and other civilian employees not in the Department of Defense, and \$300 million is for other contingencies. The cost of proposed pay adjustments for military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense is included in the estimates for that Department.

PROTECTION

Our security is an integral part of the security of the entire free world. In addition to strengthening our own defenses, we must improve the effectiveness of our partnership with our allies. This requires a greater pooling of scientific resources, a freer exchange of technological information, and closer military cooperation. Preliminary steps to accomplish these objectives were taken at the recent Paris meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This budget reflects coordinated plans for strengthening our own and allied defenses. The composition of free world forces, and the equipment with which they are provided, must be designed for the needs of an era of increasingly destructive weapons with far-reaching range. Our

Government's research and development will be generally expanded with particular emphasis on developing and improving missiles both for defensive and for counteroffensive purposes.

An effective system of military security requires closer economic cooperation through trade, investment, loans, and technical assistance with nations throughout the free world so that they can develop their resources and raise their living standards. To the degree that this economic cooperation strengthens the internal stability and ability of those nations to preserve their independence, the cause of a just and lasting peace will be advanced.

PROTECTION, INCLUDING COLLECTIVE SECURITY
[Fiscal years. In billions]

Function	Budget expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1959
	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate	
Major national security programs.....	\$44.4	\$44.9	\$45.8	\$44.3
International affairs and finance.....	0.8	1.5	1.3	1.6
Total.....	45.2	46.3	47.1	45.9

Major National Security

New obligational authority recommended for major national security programs for 1959 is \$44.3 billion, compared to \$41.0 billion estimated for 1958 and \$41.3 billion enacted for 1957.

Expenditures for these programs are estimated to be \$45.8 billion in the fiscal year 1959, \$1 billion more than in 1958 and \$1.4 billion more than in 1957. Increases are anticipated for the military functions of the Department of Defense and for atomic energy development. Expenditures for military assistance and defense support will be about the same as in the current year, but appropriations will increase to finance the lead-time for newer-type weapons. Expenditures for the stockpiling of strategic and critical materials and for the defense production expansion program will decline.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY FUNCTIONS

To accelerate the adaptation of our defenses to changing conditions, a request for supplemental appropriations of \$1.3 billion for the Department of Defense in the fiscal year 1958 is being transmitted to the Congress. The result will be to in-

crease total new obligational authority for 1958 for the military functions of the Department of Defense to \$36.6 billion. A further increase of \$2.5 billion is recommended for the fiscal year 1959, bringing the total for that year to \$39.1 billion.

It is essential that we be able promptly to modify and accelerate programs when and as important discoveries or technological developments in weapons indicate such action to be desirable. To accomplish this end, the budget includes a contingency reserve of \$500 million for defense purposes only. It also proposes that the Congress authorize the President to transfer up to \$2 billion between appropriations available for military functions of the Department of Defense. This transfer authority is important and I will not hesitate to use it.

I have already discussed the urgent problem of reorganization of the Department of Defense in the State of the Union message. In the interest of the taxpayer, improved operating and fiscal controls must accompany larger appropriations.

Expenditures in 1958 are now estimated to be \$38.9 billion compared with the original 1958 budget estimate of \$38 billion. Estimated expenditures for 1959 are \$39.8 billion, an increase of \$0.9 billion over the current estimate for 1958, \$1.3 billion higher than in 1957, and \$4 billion more than in 1956.

These increased appropriations and expenditures are necessary for a speedup in the adjustment of military strategy, forces, techniques, and organization to keep pace with the rapid strides in science and technology. Since the end of the Korean conflict, new weapons systems of vastly increased combat effectiveness have been provided for our military forces, while numbers of military units and personnel have been gradually reduced. We can expect new developments at an ever-increasing pace.

The rapidly changing character of the military program is strikingly evident when the weapons and equipment we proposed to buy in 1959 are compared with those bought as recently as 1955—the first full fiscal year after the Korean conflict.

There is hardly a production model aircraft on the Air Force's proposed list for procurement with 1959 funds that was included in its 1955 program. All the fighters and bombers proposed for procurement with 1959 appropriations will be capable of supersonic speeds and of using

guided missiles and nuclear weapons. Of the \$1.5 billion of aircraft, engines, and aeronautical equipment proposed to be bought by the Navy in 1959, about 80% will be for models which had not reached the point of being bought in production quantities in 1955.

Even in the new field of missile technology, there will be a very marked shift of emphasis from the earlier, initial weapons systems to the much more advanced systems of the future. The longer range ballistic missiles—Atlas, Titan, Thor,

Jupiter, Polaris—only one of which was beyond the technical study stage 2½ years ago, will account for nearly half of the missile program for 1959. For the total missile program, about 90% of the dollars planned for procurement in 1959 are for weapons which were not in production in operational quantities in 1955.

Most of the ships in the proposed 1959 construction program are entirely new types not to be found in the 1955 shipbuilding list. These include guided missile destroyers and the first nu-

MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	New obligational authority			Budget expenditures		
	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate
Department of Defense—Military Functions:						
Direction and coordination of defense.....	\$15	\$26	\$356	\$14	\$21	\$215
Army:						
Present programs.....	7, 672	7, 694	8, 532	9, 063	9, 043	8, 663
Proposed legislation:						
Military pay adjustment.....			184			182
Military construction.....			320			35
Navy:						
Present programs.....	10, 220	10, 469	10, 284	10, 398	10, 640	10, 724
Proposed legislation:						
Military pay adjustment.....			146			142
Military construction.....			290			47
Air Force:						
Present programs.....	17, 697	17, 219	16, 891	18, 363	18, 388	18, 008
Proposed legislation:						
Military pay adjustment.....			188			184
Military construction.....		520	965		53	544
Other central defense activities:						
Present programs.....	651	675	784	602	716	810
Proposed legislation (military construction).....						20
Proposed civilian pay adjustment.....			205			205
Subtotal.....	36, 255	¹ 36, 605	² 39, 145	38, 439	38, 861	² 39, 779
Atomic energy:						
Present programs.....	1, 962	2, 362	2, 298	1, 990	2, 300	2, 530
Proposed legislation (plant acquisition and construction).....			120			20
Subtotal.....	1, 962	2, 362	2, 418	1, 990	2, 300	2, 550
Stockpiling and expansion of defense production.....			70	490	565	422
Mutual security, military:						
Military assistance:						
Present program.....	2, 018	1, 340		2, 352	2, 200	1, 846
Proposed legislation.....			1, 800			354
Defense support:						
Present program.....	1, 110	689		1, 143	945	575
Proposed legislation.....			865			310
Subtotal.....	3, 127	2, 029	2, 665	3, 495	3, 145	3, 085
Total.....	41, 344	40, 995	44, 298	44, 414	44, 871	45, 836

¹ Includes \$1,270 million of anticipated supplemental requests.

² Does not include \$500 million for defense purposes shown in the budget under allowance for proposed legislation and contingencies.

clear-powered frigate. The first three ballistic missile submarines for the fleet are included in the 1958 supplemental request.

Fully half of the proposed 1959 program of military construction is for facilities for the Strategic Air Command and for weapons systems and equipment which will have been brought into operational use since 1955.

Research and the operation of facilities for research, development, and testing of missiles will take a much greater proportion of the research and development budget in 1959 than in 1955. In the 4 fiscal years 1956-59, roughly \$20 billion of research and development, procurement, military personnel, and construction funds will have been programed for the research, development, test, and evaluation of new weapons systems to bring them to operational status.

Programs requiring greater emphasis.—The budget provides funds for a still greater expansion of the swiftly progressing intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missile programs. The Jupiter and Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles are being placed in production. Work on the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile will be accelerated.

Funds are also provided to speed up the operational availability of the Polaris intermediate range ballistic missile and the first three submarines designed to employ this weapon.

Expansion and further improvement of the continental defense early warning network will be undertaken and construction of a new ballistic missile detection system started, including the necessary facilities for communication with the North American Defense Command and the Strategic Air Command.

This budget includes funds for accelerating the dispersal of Strategic Air Command aircraft to additional bases and for the construction of "alert" facilities. The readiness of these retaliatory forces must be measured in minutes. Not only must planes be kept constantly in the air, but also additional combat air crews must be able to take off almost instantly upon receipt of warning of an impending enemy attack. Takeoff time will be appreciably shortened by constructing additional runways, fueling stations, and quarters for the crews at the runway. Within the total appropriations for the fiscal years 1958 and 1959, about \$0.5 billion is provided for the dispersal

and increased readiness of the Strategic Air Command.

Funds are provided for an expanded research and development effort on military satellites and other outer space vehicles, and on antimissile missile systems, to be carried out directly under the Secretary of Defense. An increase is also included for basic and applied research in other areas.

Antisubmarine warfare capabilities will be increased to counter potential enemy submarine threats.

While greater attention is given in this budget to the foregoing areas, conventional warfare capabilities of all the military services are also being improved. For example, funds are provided to initiate production of new models of small arms and ammunition, standardized for use by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Expenditures by the Atomic Energy Commission in the fiscal year 1959 will increase to \$2,550 million, \$250 million more than estimated for 1958, which in turn was \$310 million over 1957. These increases reflect our determination both to increase the tempo of progress in achieving a greater nuclear military capability and to press ahead in our successful development of the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

From year to year we have hoped that success would finally crown our efforts to reach an international agreement which would permit, if not general disarmament, at least some reduction in the production of nuclear armaments. Again we find ourselves in a situation that leaves us no choice but to test and produce further quantities of such armaments for the defense of the free world. The substantial increase in the availability of uranium concentrates and the expanded capacity of the Atomic Energy Commission's production plants will result in greater production and larger operating expenditures in 1959.

During the last several years, the Atomic Energy Commission's research and development in both peaceful and military applications of atomic energy have grown rapidly to the highest levels ever attained. Continuing emphasis will be given to basic research, and construction will con-

tinue on four additional high-energy particle accelerators in the multibillion electron-volt range.

Applied research and development activities will be increased in 1959 and concentrated on those aspects which appear most likely to result in reaching technical goals. In particular, there will be continuing emphasis on naval and other military nuclear propulsion reactors, and on the more promising approaches to development of reactors to produce safe and economic electrical energy for civilian use.

STOCKPILING AND DEFENSE PRODUCTION EXPANSION

Expenditures for stockpiling and expansion of defense production are estimated to be \$565 million in 1958 and \$422 million in 1959. The stockpile objectives on all but a few scarce materials will be substantially completed under contracts now in force. In October 1957, an advisory committee was established to work with the Office of Defense Mobilization on a study of stockpiling policies and programs in the light of current concepts of war and defense.

The Defense Production Act of 1950 has provided much of the basic authority required to bring about needed expansion of production capacity, to provide controls over the use of scarce materials, and to initiate other measures essential to enhance our military strength. It should be extended another 2 years beyond its present expiration date of June 30, 1958. I do not now anticipate any specific new programs which will require financial assistance under this legislation, but accelerated research and development in certain military programs may require further expansion of production potentials for key materials. The authority to set priorities and allocate materials, currently being used for critical materials for direct military and atomic energy procurement, will continue to be needed.

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Soviet ambition poses a threat to the free countries that takes several forms: open armed attack, internal subversion, and economic domination. Mutual security helps to meet all forms of this threat. For the fiscal year 1959, I am recommending new obligational authority of \$3,940 million for the mutual security program. Expenditures are estimated to be \$3,868 million.

Two portions of the mutual security program—

military assistance and defense support—are primarily related to our military defense effort and, therefore, are discussed in this section of the message. The other portions of the mutual security program, while they contribute to security and defensive strength, are primarily designed to promote the economic development and political stability of less developed countries. They are discussed in the international affairs and finance section of this message. The two parts of the mutual security program are combined in the following table:

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Function and program	Budget expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1959
	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate	
Major national security:				
Military assistance:				
Present program	\$2,352	\$2,200	\$1,846	-----
Proposed legislation			354	\$1,800
Defense support:				
Present program	1,143	945	575	-----
Proposed legislation			310	865
Subtotal	3,495	3,145	3,085	2,665
International affairs and finance:				
Development loan fund		20	174	625
Technical cooperation:				
Present program	114	136	103	-----
Proposed legislation			47	164
Special and other assistance:				
Present program	341	448	266	-----
Proposed legislation			193	486
Subtotal	455	604	783	1,275
Total, mutual security	3,950	3,749	3,868	¹ 3,940

¹ Compares with new obligational authority of \$3,807 million for 1957 and \$2,764 million for 1958.

Mutual security, military assistance.—The nature of military assistance varies by country and area, taking into account military need, technological abilities, and division of defense responsibility among the United States and other countries. Countries which have received military assistance maintain for the common defense of the free world the equivalent of 200 army divisions, and some 23,000 aircraft and 2,300 naval vessels. From 1950 through 1957 our assistance has augmented by about 17% the total defense expenditures of these countries.

In Europe, this assistance is programed according to the defensive strategy for the whole North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Military assistance for certain other countries, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, will continue to give special emphasis to the threat of internal subversion while also contributing to the deterrence of foreign attack.

In addition to missiles and other advanced weapons, the military assistance program provides for necessary conventional equipment, supplies, construction, and training for ground, sea, and air defense of friendly countries.

Continuing efforts are being made to maintain the forces needed for international defense purposes at the lowest possible cost. The strength of forces in assisted countries has been and will continue to be reviewed to insure that our support is related to current military requirements and technology. We are financing military equipment wherever possible on a basis of sales for cash and credit rather than by grants.

Recommended new obligational authority for military assistance in the fiscal year 1959 is \$1,800 million. To fulfill probable needs growing out of agreements at the recent NATO meetings, an additional amount of up to \$200 million for procurement of more missiles and other new equipment is covered by the allowance for proposed legislation and contingencies for the fiscal year 1958. Expenditures for military assistance in 1959, which will be made primarily from obligational authority enacted in previous years, are estimated to be \$2,200 million, the same amount estimated for 1958.

I firmly believe that the current United States outlay for protection would have to be substantially larger were it not for the military assistance program which enables other countries to contribute more to collective defense. Without our military assistance program the same degree of protection might not be obtainable at any cost.

Mutual security, defense support.—Our military assistance is extended to many countries that are maintaining collective defense forces beyond their economic means. Therefore, we supply economic assistance under the appropriations for defense support so that these countries can provide for their defense forces and at the same time maintain economic and political stability.

New obligational authority of \$865 million is requested for defense support. Expenditures in 1959 are estimated at \$885 million or \$60 million below the estimate for 1958.

In determining these amounts, account has been taken of the most effective use of local currencies obtained as counterpart for assistance dollars and from sales of surplus United States farm products. The local currencies, which are in addition to dollar grants, are used to help channel the countries' own economic resources to the most desirable objectives. However, these currencies cannot replace the dollars needed for materials and equipment that must be imported, mainly from the United States.

International Affairs and Finance

The major objective of our international economic policies and programs is to help build the free world's economic strength in the interest of mutual well-being and the maintenance of peace. Expanded production, improved efficiency, and greater economic progress for ourselves and other peoples of the free world will depend to a considerable extent on an increase in the flow of international trade and investment. To aid in this worldwide objective and at the same time to expand our markets abroad and thus create new jobs at home, I am recommending the extension with broadened authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program. I am also recommending an expansion of the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank, an increase in new obligational authority for developmental and technical assistance under the mutual security program, and the authorization of funds to assist in the completion of the Inter-American Highway.

International affairs and finance are estimated to require \$1.3 billion of expenditures in the fiscal year 1959, \$156 million less than in 1958. The decline reflects primarily the fact that in 1958 the Export-Import Bank has made a substantial disbursement under a previously authorized loan to the United Kingdom.

Reciprocal trade.—In order to pay for imports of goods and services from the United States other countries must be able to export to us. Progress for them and for us will receive its greatest impetus by development of the most favorable fields of production coupled with a gradual but steady reduction of unjustifiable

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE
[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Budget expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1959
	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate	
Economic and technical development:				
Export-Import Bank	-\$100	\$393	\$51	-----
Nonmilitary mutual security program:				
Development loan fund		20	174	\$625
Technical cooperation:				
Present program	114	136	103	-----
Proposed legislation			47	164
Special and other assistance:				
Present program	341	448	266	-----
Proposed legislation			193	486
Other:				
Present programs (primarily reimbursement to Department of Agriculture for commodities shipped abroad)	187	136	139	9
Proposed legislation (Inter-American Highway)				10
Foreign information and exchange activities:				
United States Information Agency	108	100	108	110
Department of State, exchange of persons	18	26	21	21
President's special international program	7	15	11	8
Conduct of foreign affairs:				
Department of State	155	192	199	181
Other	2	2	2	2
Total	832	1,468	1,312	1,615

¹ Compares with new obligational authority of \$1,131 million for 1957 and \$3,292 million (including \$2 billion of anticipated supplemental authorizations for Export-Import Bank) for 1958.

trade barriers. We welcome the proposed European common market and free trade area as steps toward these broad goals.

We live in a world of economic, no less than political, interdependence. As the greatest producer, consumer, and exporter in the world, the United States must be a dependable market for foreign goods if mutually beneficial trade is to grow and prosper. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act should be extended for 5 years beyond its expiration date of June 30, 1958, with certain new authority for the President to negotiate gradual and selective tariff reductions. Legisla-

tion should also be enacted to authorize United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation to improve the administrative efficiency of our trade agreements with other countries. To provide coordinated Cabinet level direction of this program at home, I have recently established the Trade Policy Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Commerce.

In addition, I recommend that the Congress delete a rider which in past years has been attached to the Defense Appropriation Act and which virtually prohibits normal competitive bidding by other countries on many defense contracts. The rider is clearly inconsistent with policies designed to expand international trade and makes our heavy defense costs even more burdensome.

Export-Import Bank.—The Export-Import Bank has had a steadily increasing role in promoting United States exports and imports and in financing economic development projects abroad through loans to United States and foreign firms and to foreign countries. Since the Bank requires repayment in dollars, its loans for economic development are made for projects that will earn or save dollars for the borrowing country, or for projects in countries with adequate prospects of earning dollars from other sources. It is now estimated that the lending authority provided the Bank in 1955 will be entirely committed sometime during 1959. To assure continuity in the Bank's operation and to provide for possible emergencies, I am requesting \$2 billion in new obligational authority to expand the Bank's lending capacity. This new authorization should be made available before the end of the current fiscal year.

Nonmilitary mutual security.—While strengthened trade legislation and additional lending authority for the Export-Import Bank will help substantially in promoting world commerce and economic development, these actions are insufficient in themselves to accomplish our international objectives.

Few national desires are stronger today than the wish of the peoples of less developed countries to improve their living standards. It is our national policy to encourage and assist this aspiration. As a country blessed with great natural resources, modern industry, and high productivity, we recognize the compelling humanitarian

reasons for helping less fortunate people abroad as we help them at home.

The progress of some less developed countries will be dangerously slow without outside help, despite their best efforts. The people of these countries are conscious of the technological advances made and the levels of living enjoyed beyond their borders, and are understandably impatient for similar achievements. If Western help is unavailable or inadequate, these countries may become dependent upon the Communist bloc. We are concerned that they strengthen their independence and find prospects for improved living standards within a free society. It is my earnest hope that other free governments will also enlarge their efforts in advancing the development, trade, and well-being of less developed countries.

In addition, without economic progress, military security may prove illusory. People who see little improvement in their economic conditions may question the value of the freedom that our mutual defense efforts are intended to preserve. The events of the cold war reemphasize the importance of our helping to insure that peoples of less developed countries have faith in their future.

For these various reasons, it is critically necessary to carry forward our development loans, technical assistance, and other special types of assistance under the mutual security program.

Mutual security, development loan fund.—In many cases, urgent needs for economic development in less developed countries cannot be financed by the Export-Import Bank or by other sources such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or private institutions. To meet such needs for financing economically and technically sound projects, the development loan fund was authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1957. Loans from this fund may be made on less stringent terms than Export-Import Bank or other such loans, with repayments in local currencies as well as dollars.

Projects are now being considered and negotiations are being started with a number of countries which will result in the commitment of an appreciable volume of loans by the end of the fiscal year 1958. To make possible the continuation and expansion of such development loans, I am requesting provision of \$625 million in new

obligational authority for 1959, as authorized by the Congress in basic legislation last year.

Mutual security, technical cooperation.—Because of technical assistance extended under the mutual security program, millions of people today are better off than before and productivity has been significantly increased. For example, disease has been lessened in many countries as people have been taught water purification techniques. Illiteracy has been greatly reduced. Farmers in many countries have learned how to diversify crops and improve livestock strains.

This budget requests \$164 million of new obligational authority in 1959 to carry forward the United States program of technical assistance and also to provide for our joining with other nations to increase the financial resources of the United Nations program of technical assistance. This increase will help to broaden the scope of multilateral cooperation through a new program for regional surveys of resources and for regional training institutes approved last December by the United Nations General Assembly. I am convinced of the need for our own technical assistance program and I am equally convinced of the need for multilateral technical assistance programs, in which our contribution is multiplied by the funds and experts of many nations.

Mutual security, special and other assistance.—The budget for the mutual security program provides for certain additional special activities, such as support vital to the stability of a number of friendly countries not covered by other categories of aid, our contributions to the United Nations International Children's Fund, and our refugee programs.

It is obviously impossible to predict today all of the problems which the free world will face during 1959. In order to help meet the emergencies that experience shows inevitably arise, I believe it necessary that a special contingency fund again be provided in the mutual security appropriation. For this purpose, \$200 million is recommended for 1959.

Diplomacy, informational and cultural programs, and exchange of persons.—Greater understanding among nations, on a people-to-people as well as a government-to-government basis, is a necessary part of our efforts to remove the misunderstandings that hinder disarmament, the building of a safeguarded peace, and the strength-

ening of freedom. It is especially important that Americans and peoples who have recently gained, or are approaching, independence come to appreciate each other's problems and aspirations. It is similarly important that Americans and Eastern Europeans renew the contacts that once were an important strand in friendly international relations.

The budget recommends \$183 million in new obligational authority in 1959 for the conduct of foreign affairs, primarily for the operation of the Department of State. This amount includes provision for additional foreign service posts in Africa and for the strengthening of consular, economic, and political work in the Middle East and the Far East. New obligational authority requested for the United States Information Agency, and for exchange of persons, cultural presentations, and international trade fairs amounts to \$139 million; within this total, there is provision for more exchanges of leaders, scientists, and students with Eastern Europe and other areas.

I wish here to call attention specifically to the need for a supplemental appropriation for the Brussels Fair. Congressional action on this important activity last year left United States participation badly hampered in comparison with programs of other nations, especially the Soviet Union. I consider this item of particular importance to our country and urge the Congress to expedite its approval.

Americans have a tradition of uniting in action when their freedoms and welfare are threatened. We do not shirk our clear responsibilities when new challenges arise.

I feel confident that this budget expresses the way in which the American people will want to respond to the promises and dangers of the dawn-ing age of space conquest. New dimensions must be added to our defenses, and outmoded activities must be discarded. Closer international cooperation is vital in a world where great distances are losing their meaning. As we devote more of our efforts and resources to these compelling tasks, we will have to limit our demands for less essential services and benefits provided by the Federal Government.

Our response must rise above personal selfish-

ness, above sectional interests, above political partisanship. The goal of lasting peace with justice, difficult though it may be to achieve, is worth all of our efforts. We must make the necessary sacrifices to attain it. Our own people demand it and the nations of the world look to us for leadership.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

JANUARY 13, 1958.

Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the completion of the Saint Lawrence Seaway in 1959 will mark the inauguration of a new era of direct transoceanic water-borne commerce between inland ports of the Great Lakes of North America and the far-flung ports of the world; and

WHEREAS, from January 1 to December 31, 1959, the City of Chicago in the State of Illinois will celebrate the completion of the Saint Lawrence Seaway inviting attention to the importance of the Seaway and the North American ports that it will serve;


WHEREAS the program of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration at Chicago will include the Pan American Games of 1959, a Festival of the Americas, and an International Fair and Exposition which have for their purpose the promotion of international understanding and the display of the products of the world; and

WHEREAS the Congress, by a joint resolution approved August 30, 1957, 71 Stat. 512, authorized the President of the United States, by proclamation or in such other manner as he might deem proper, to invite the States of the Union and foreign countries to participate in the Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration to be held at Chicago during 1959 for the purpose of promoting foreign and domestic commerce and fostering good will among nations:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby invite the States of the Union and foreign countries to participate in the programs of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration to be held at Chicago, Illinois, in 1959.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.



By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

¹ No. 3217; 23 Fed. Reg. 379.

Communism in the Americas

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

Today I want to talk to you about the role of communism in the Americas. It is a thoroughly sinister role. It is the same role in North America, Central America, and South America, or elsewhere in the world. It is unchanged. It may have taken on a new coloration, protective to the Communists themselves but always destructive to the rest of us.

This role involves both aspects of the international Communist movement, the ideology of the party line held out by Communists and, even worse, their subversive intervention in the internal affairs of other states and peoples. This, of course, is utterly contrary to our way of life in the Americas and will *never* succeed. The basic task of Communist Parties all over the world in trying to carry out both aspects is, in the words of Lenin, to combine the strictest loyalty to the ideas of communism with an ability to make all the necessary practical compromises. In the thirties, with the Communist Parties then only small minorities, one of the compromises which was developed to establish contact with the masses, either through collaboration with the leaders of non-Communist organizations or through appealing to the masses over the heads of their leaders, was the so-called "popular front."

Especially in times when Communists wish to lull others into complacency and relaxation such as the present, the "popular front" tactic is applied through the development and infiltration of

organizations, often having objectives or appeals which appear to coincide with the legitimate aspirations of a group—the technique of the soporific—which are then used to achieve Communist objectives. In this way hundreds of thousands of people are made the innocent tools of the Communist conspiracy. We have had this problem of "fronts" in the United States; it is particularly serious in Latin America.

The Soviets now control 13 major international front organizations, each with dozens of subsidiary organizations all over the world. Each is a huge "interlocking directorate" linking the Kremlin to a vast network of national organizations operated by local Communists or dupes. All have a common purpose—to draw as many social groups as possible closer to communism and to make amenable to them the global aims of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

These fronts are divided, one from another, on functional lines so that, despite their similar operational patterns, they can "offer all things to all men." There is a front for "peace," perhaps the cruelest of all, since all mankind yearns for that; there are others for youth, women, labor, international traders, journalists, intellectuals, and professionals. Each has a theme designed to attract a following from the particular target group. They have several things in common: They are all controlled at the top by Communists, directly or indirectly; they engage in vast propaganda activities; today they emphasize "national liberation" and, particularly in Latin America, "economic independence." Through these fronts, and with Soviet financial support when required, local, national, and international

¹ Address made before a joint meeting of the Miami-Dade County Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations Association of Greater Miami at Miami, Fla., on Jan. 14 (press release 10 dated Jan. 13).

meetings are organized; travel to the Communist hinterland is arranged and financed; selected candidates are trained and indoctrinated; and an infinite variety of propaganda publications in all languages is distributed.

Sometimes some of the machinations of the Soviet "front men" in Latin America get unexpected publicity. You have undoubtedly read, as I have recently, about how the number-one Communist labor leader of Latin America, Vicente Lombardo Toledano of Mexico, has been busy denying the authenticity of a letter attributed to him by the Government of Ecuador. In the letter, described as a copy of a circular he is supposed to have sent to all affiliates of the Communist-dominated union he heads—the Confederation of Latin American Workers—Lombardo Toledano calls on his lieutenants to furnish him with the answers to a long list of questions bearing on the military and general security status of their respective countries to be used in connection with a Communist offensive in Latin America in 1958. To those of us conversant with Communist techniques and tactics, it is not surprising to find a foreign Communist leader calling on his various underlings to betray their own countries.

Just a week ago the Associated Press carried a dispatch from Rio de Janeiro concerning a report prepared by the Brazilian Foreign Office. According to the A. P., the Brazilian Government has copies of minutes of meetings held in Moscow last November by Latin American Communist leaders when it was decided to use Soviet offers of aid to Brazil as part of a campaign to make Brazil a spearhead of Latin American hostility to the United States.

Behind the "front" organizations we find the Communist Party proper. Nominally, the Communist Party is legal in only five Latin American Republics—Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay—but in almost all of them Communists are trying to play their kind of subversive game. Party membership apparently varies from a few dozen Communists in several of the Middle American countries to around 50,000 and 80,000 in Brazil and Argentina, respectively. The grand total has been calculated at little more than 200,000, but numbers do not necessarily describe their influence.

The Communists have both immediate and long-range objectives in Latin America, as elsewhere.

Ultimately, of course, they would like to seize power and try to set up "popular democratic" regimes in which communism would reign. That being out of the question, they are attempting a gradual approach, minimizing their difference with the non-Communist left, playing down their ties with international communism, and, in general, seeking to gain some degree of respectability and acceptance. In this, they have been notably unsuccessful. The Communists concentrate on trying to infiltrate as best they can into intellectual circles and also into key positions in government, organized labor, student groups, and public-opinion media. They then attempt to sow the seeds of chaos, disunity, and other conditions designed to break down the normal democratic functions.

Appraisal of Forces Combating Communism

In appraising communism's chances in the Americas, there are, it seems to me, certain fundamental points to be recognized. I outline them, with the sober reminder that neither we nor our friends to the south can ever be complacent in the face of communism's eternal threat to man's freedom and welfare.

The first and foremost point to remember is that the Communists by themselves represent no immediate threat to the Latin American countries themselves nor to United States national security, for they are in no position anywhere in the hemisphere to gain power through legitimate means. This is not to say that, even though they are by themselves a minority, the Communists do not represent a constant danger. With their underground cadres ever alert to take advantage of popular discontent arising out of turbulent political conditions or widespread economic crisis, the Communist apparatus requires continued vigilance. To gain power through the ballot, Communist agents masquerade as super-nationalists, hoping to penetrate behind the scenes where they can effectively work for a foreign principal. The example of the Arbenz regime's betrayal of national interests in favor of alien ideology and its subsequent overthrow at the hands of the very Guatemalan people it sought to defraud is too fresh in memory to be forgotten throughout the hemisphere.

It was because of the events in Guatemala following the election of President Arbenz that the

Tenth Inter-American Conference (the pro-Communist Foreign Minister of Guatemala dissenting) approved at Caracas in March 1954 a resolution on the "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics." Known as resolution 93, it declares that, if the international Communist movement should come to dominate the political institutions of any American state, that would be a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of us all, endangering the peace of America and calling for immediate consultations regarding appropriate action to be taken. On a permanent basis, it further calls for continuing disclosures and exchanges of information between the various American Republics which would counteract the subversive activities of the international Communist conspiracy.

In line with this resolution, there is a new vigilance and awareness on the part of virtually all the signatories to the so-called Caracas resolution of the need to identify those who spread the propaganda or who travel in the interests of international communism. There is an awareness of the need to ascertain the source of their funds and the identity of their agents. Nevertheless, there is much more to be done as the Communist web of intrigue and subversion continues to spin itself out under ever-changing guises.

The second encouraging factor I would emphasize is that behind this shield of organized governmental anti-Communist effort stands an equally individual but nonetheless potent defense. I refer to the fact that atheistic communism is an anathema to the deeply religious Latin American people. For, if the continent to the south of us is blessed with a rich storehouse of still-buried raw materials, its inhabitants are endowed with a profound belief in God and the spiritual treasures of free men. I am convinced that those Latin Americans who enjoy personal liberty and social justice, along with others who still aspire to reach the eternal goals of all really democratic societies, will not sell their precious birthrights for a mess of Soviet totalitarian pottage, no matter how alluring its description or how deceptive its package.

The third factor to be counted on to work against the Communist cause is the very nature of human intelligence, as keen and perceptive in the Americas as anywhere. The "cult of personality"

in the Soviet Union, theoretically banished after the end of Stalinism's bloody tyranny, again raises its head on the shoulders of a Khrushchev, as the Molotovs and Zhukovs suddenly fall at his feet. American public opinion was deeply shocked when the Soviet overlords crushed a valiant unarmed Hungarian people by brute force. It is to the everlasting credit of the peoples of America that their appointed representatives to the United Nations last month, in the name of human rights and the very dignity of man, sought to save the lives of Hungarian freedom fighters arrested because they had sought to liberate their homeland from Communist oppression. Soviet propaganda boasts following the Sputnik launchings conveyed veiled military threats against the free world. These attempts at intimidation were not lost upon the American Republics.

Symptomatic of this recognition in Latin America of the Communist danger was the forthright order of the day issued last November 27, anniversary of Brazil's abortive Communist uprising of 1935, by the Brazilian Minister of War, General Henrique Teixeira Lott. General Lott likened communism to a "venomous serpent seeking to poison all humanity," said its "materialistic and brutish philosophy" was repugnant to Brazilian sentiments, and reaffirmed "with conviction our decision to remain faithful to the sacred principles which govern the Brazilian nation."

I could also cite here such recent public announcements as that of President Manuel Prado of Peru in favor of closer cooperation between the countries of Latin America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the struggle against, as he very well put it, "Marxist imperialism"; or the address of President José María Lemus of El Salvador in which he warned of the existence of a Communist threat aimed at gaining control of local labor unions and political parties; or the newspaper interview of Brazilian Foreign Minister José Carlos de Macedo Soares in which he said that, despite cultural and sports missions and offers of economic and technical assistance, the Soviet Union's attempts to divide Brazil from the United States and to win new converts for its ideology in Latin America had achieved no noticeable success.

The fourth point to be made in this summary review of basic forces working in the hemisphere

against communism is the ever-increasing cultural exchange and cooperation between the various American Republics, based on century-old ties. Our official programs, important as they are, form only a small part of the overall picture. Of the Latin Americans who study abroad, over 75 percent come to the United States. As more of our Latin American neighbors visit here as tourists, more United States citizens are going to live in Latin America, while Latin Americans, unrestricted by quota visa regulations, are relatively free to take up permanent residence in this country. If Spanish is becoming the second language of the United States, so English is rapidly on its way to similar status in Latin America. As the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, has so succinctly pointed out: Fortunately, while there are wide variations in the types of institutions and degrees of democracy among the American nations, their peoples are all motivated by deep underlying spiritual forces. They desire independence; they want to live in peace and to work for rising economic, educational, and social levels. Such is our common cultural heritage. Such are our common aspirations.

Growing Awareness in U.S. Business Community

Let us turn for a moment to the United States companies doing business in Latin America. More and more they have come to realize that public relations is a vital part of the substance of their operations. They recognize that the American business community abroad is just as much a target of the agents of international communism as is the United States Government itself. Communist agents seek to discredit American businessmen, to disparage American products, to stir up criticism of American financial methods, to invite labor difficulties. Even though American industrial concerns abroad are in the vanguard of those who practice modern industrial relations, Communist agents are always trying to promote strikes or violence against them. It is reassuring to note greater awareness in the United States business community of the need for their representatives to possess a breadth of culture and a perceptiveness which will enable them to quickly understand and to adjust themselves to the atmosphere in which they are working abroad. Of equal value is an intelligent curiosity and a human approach expressed through a genuine, sympathetic, and active interest in the welfare of the communities where they are stationed. American private enterprise

has much of which to be proud, including its role in the vanguard against communism in America and elsewhere. Indeed, its best reference is the high level of our own economy and the lasting contributions to other nations the world over which have flowed from our system of the "people's capitalism."

If the foregoing are perhaps the most obvious factors successfully at work combating communism in Latin America, there is one rather new development which may well portend what could be a real revolutionary contribution on the side of democratic social betterment and civic progress in the hemisphere. You will recall that at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference last August Secretary of the Treasury Anderson raised the question as to whether excessive military expenditures on the part of many Latin American Republics were not in fact draining their national resources and impeding highest living standards for their populations.² Now we recognize the need to maintain forces adequate to provide internal security and for the mutual defense of the hemisphere. The problem for any country, of course, is to determine how much is necessary to spend for these purposes. It might be argued that unnecessary expenditures play into the hands of Communist propagandists. Conversely, therefore, spending on productive private industrial capacity or public works would improve standards of living, thereby helping to develop a fundamental and lasting immunity to Communist subversion. Hemisphere reaction to Secretary Anderson's query has reflected, in my judgment, a widespread readiness to study this question further, and it is my hope that in 1958 some constructive action along these lines may be achieved.

The most persuasive reason to question the need for large and expensive military establishments arises out of the realization that in the Americas we have developed a hemispheric approach to security which is sealed in the Rio treaty. We have unanimously agreed that an attack on any one state would be considered as an attack on all. This concept of collective security has served as a pattern for the strengthening of the entire free world.

Our purpose is peace, both with the rest of the world and among ourselves. The repeatedly suc-

² BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 463.

cessful application of the Rio treaty in halting almost immediately outbreaks of armed aggression has proved beyond doubt the desire and ability of the countries of the Americas to live peacefully together. In short, resort to war as a means of settling disputes in the Americas has become virtually unthinkable.

Soviet Trade Offensive

Against this background of a peaceful American Continent, determined to work together as free men to improve our lives and those of our children, we now are confronted by press headlines of a so-called Soviet trade offensive in Latin America. The phrase, of course, is dramatic, but what does it really mean? Undoubtedly, as compared to the situation of previous months, there have been more reports recently of offers being made by Soviet spokesmen and salesmen to exchange Russian manufactured goods for Latin American raw materials. But, of course, as businessmen you know that there is a long way from an offer to a closed deal. We need to keep the facts as we know them in perspective.

In 1957, according to latest estimates, Latin American trade with the Soviet bloc actually decreased around 12 percent, which means that Latin American trade with the Soviet bloc represented a little more than 1 percent of all Latin American trade. This 1 percent in turn was concentrated largely in four Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay. If the dollar value of Cuban sugar exports to the U.S.S.R. had not shown a temporary sharp rise as a result of exceptionally high world prices, Latin American trade totals with the Soviet bloc in 1957 would have shown an overall drop of about one-quarter as compared to 1956. According to unofficial figures, Argentine trade was off more than 50 percent, while Brazil's slight increase contrasted with Uruguay's small decrease.

There is understandably a desire on the part of our neighbors to examine cannily their trade with the Soviet bloc, particularly with an eye to the utilization of credits which have accumulated as a result of previously unsatisfactory trade relations. Undoubtedly my colleagues in the various Foreign Offices of Latin America are well aware of the many pitfalls involved in trade with the Soviets. Their countries have already experienced bitter dissatisfaction with bloc compliance

under commercial agreements and especially the growth of inconvertible balances. To wipe out such a balance, reported to be \$20 million, I understand, the Argentine Government has just announced dispatch of a mission to Eastern Europe. Another probable cause of Latin American caution, if experience is any teacher, is the knowledge that the Soviet bloc often seeks to use trade as a means of getting "a foot in the door." What this then invites, as we have seen in this country, as well as in Canada, Argentina, Iran, Australia, and Peru—to name a few with somewhat the same bitter experience—is the use of Soviet-bloc personnel, protected by diplomatic immunity, for improper and illegal activities, including subversion and espionage.

In citing the dangers of trade with the Soviets, I do not wish to overlook that some of the Latin American Republics are now faced with serious economic problems, characterized in most cases by abnormally large supplies of raw materials unable to find their way into normal export channels. We are also concerned with these problems, for we realize we live in a world of interdependence, with the fates of Latin America and the United States inextricably intertwined.

Record of U.S. Assistance

When critical needs have arisen, the record shows that we have not failed to assist our American allies. A glance over the last 2 years reflects the varied and numerous channels of our assistance. The Export-Import Bank issued loan authorizations totaling \$659 million. Our share of the jointly operated United States technical assistance program reached \$68 million. Through the technical assistance programs of the Organization of American States and the United Nations we contributed an additional \$11.7 million. \$80 million was granted as special aid. Under P. L. 480 legislation for the disposal of agricultural surpluses, the United States made available to Latin America \$221 million. In 1957, the only year of its existence, a special fund authorized under the amendment sponsored by your distinguished Senator, Mr. Smathers, provided about \$20 million of long-term credit for colonization, public health, and sanitation purposes. Through the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, of which we are members, Latin America

drew down \$160 million to meet balance-of-payments requirements and borrowed another \$120 million.

United States assistance to the other American Republics has also taken the form of our participation in financial stabilization programs amounting to over \$200 million, consisting of U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank, and IMF pledges of currency. These programs still serve as invisible partners, ever ready to lend a friendly helping hand to overcome monetary emergencies. Thanks to such a program, the rate of increase in the cost of living in Chile, for instance, was reduced by more than 50 percent in 1957, for the second consecutive year. This is a record of courage and determination of which the Ibañez administration and the Chilean people can well be proud. The same might be said for the achievements of the other countries fighting back valiantly against the ravages of inflation.

The current reports of Soviet trade offers were very well described by Secretary Dulles at his last press conference.³ He pointed out the Communists always like to fish in troubled waters but concluded he did not think the Soviets would catch many unwary Latin American customers. And, the Secretary declared, if the need of Latin America grows as a result of its present economic difficulties, our desire to meet that need will correspondingly grow.

What I feel is most important to grasp is that the Communists, no matter how ultranationalist their pretensions and protestations, are really not interested in helping solve Latin America's problems but rather in complicating them. For in their Marxist credo the end always justifies the means.

Communism's Cancerous Threat

If I have repeatedly emphasized the Communist use of nationalism as a Trojan horse of political penetration, it is because I consider such deception a most despicable betrayal of one of our most precious American heritages. The love

of one's country is one of man's noblest sentiments. But, like the other great sentiments, it is susceptible to base exploitation, to a perversion that can convert the love of one's nation to a fierce chauvinism and to hatred for one's neighbor.

Our American system stands for genuine and legitimate love of nation. It is an ever-evolving system for national self-realization. It calls for the kind of cooperation which will make it possible for each nation in our inter-American system to develop its human and natural resources so that its highest national aspirations will be fulfilled. Our American system is true international cooperation, for it is based on respect for national self-determination and on respect for the will to develop the national community, which is so alive in Latin America today.

Communism, however, is the grave enemy of the national community. Whenever it penetrates, it seeks to disturb, to agitate, to subvert, to destroy. It is not a movement of conscience which seeks to bring to light the responsible quarrel with conditions as they are in order to improve those conditions. Its aim is to pick the quarrel which will confuse and destroy the national community, the quarrel which will paralyze the will to develop the nation, the quarrel which will pervert the love of nation to hate of one part of the nation for another part, and hate of the nation's neighbors.

I bear great faith in our American system; I have an abiding belief in our common patriotic love of country; and I feel deeply that communism's cancerous threat to the national life of each of the 21 American Republics clearly exposes communism as the dangerous enemy of our finest traditions of nationhood.

I am confident that I echo the sentiments of the leaders and the peoples of the Americas when I leave you with this closing thought—that there is no place in this God-given and God-fearing New World of 360 million souls for anything resembling the materialistic and atheistic concepts of godless communism.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 131.

Maintaining the Technological Strength of the United States

by James R. Killian, Jr.

*Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*¹

It might have been expected that I would talk tonight about missiles and other aspects of our relative position in defense science and technology. Since the President will report these matters in his state of the Union message later this week, I wish to speak out of my experience as science administrator and educator on the maintenance of America's technological leadership—in the deepest sense a subject of the most fundamental importance to all our progress, military and otherwise. I have long been on record as being soberly concerned about the maintenance of our position in technology—defining technology as a combination of science, engineering, and production. We have great strengths. We have great resources. We also face relentless, able competition that demands of us steadiness, high-quality performance, and indefatigable effort.

Let me start by reporting briefly, and for the first time publicly, on the organization and activity of the President's Science Advisory Committee, of which I am a member, and the wholly new post I hold as Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.²

In notable contrast to most advisory committees, this Science Advisory Committee is a *working* committee. Some members are spending nearly full time, others more than half time; all have accepted heavy responsibility to carry forward the advisory work of the committee.

The 17 members are broadly representative of

American science. There are two Nobel laureates on the committee. Every member has had experience in defense technology. A number of members have conducted or led research which has strengthened our national security. All have been important contributors to basic research or to the formulation of national science policy or to the leadership of scientific institutions or research organizations.

In carrying on its work for the President, the committee is organized into panels. In staffing these panels, the policy has been to seek out the best qualified scientists or engineers we can find and draw upon their judgment and experience in studying the problems confronting us. In areas of our competence we seek the objective scientific facts upon which judgments and policies can be based.

None of the men asked to serve has failed to accept or has even hesitated. This readiness to respond is convincing evidence of the sense of urgency and public responsibility of the American scientific and engineering community. This willingness to rally to the needs of the Nation today is not limited to this Advisory Committee and its task forces. We see it throughout the country—in the Nation's defense laboratories, in industry, in educational institutions, and in many other advisory groups. This responsiveness to current national need, which is deeply appreciated in the Government, is evidence of the vitality and strength of American science and technology.

It should be evident that the problems of American science and technology cannot be solved nor quick cures be provided for our troubles by an appointment of an individual or organization of a committee. The new office and committee is in an

¹ Address made at the congressional dinner of the Women's National Press Club at Washington, D.C., on Jan. 7 (White House press release).

² For an announcement of Dr. Killian's appointment, see President Eisenhower's address on "Science in National Security," BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1957, p. 819.

extraordinarily favorable position to help by mobilizing the best scientific advice of the country, by maintaining good communications between the scientific community and the Government, and by assisting Federal agencies in carrying out their science programs.

Strength of American Technology

And now with this brief report before you I wish to examine a few of the more subtle factors affecting America's technological leadership.

The first industrial revolution was ushered in by Great Britain. The United States, it has been observed, leaped over the first industrial revolution and ushered in the second. Is Russia leapfrogging over the second industrial revolution and moving swiftly into a third, leaving the U.S. still preoccupied with the second? It is in the light of this question that I discuss our present concerns about American technology.

Let me make my conviction immediately clear that the United States today is technologically strong and growing stronger. I do not believe that we have lost our technological leadership nor that we are predestined to lose it in the future—provided we increase our technological zest and audacity and do not fail to remedy our weaknesses. We possess enormous strength in capital assets, in productivity, in labor skills, and in scientific resources. We must maintain a rate of advance that will insure our position of advantage.

The launching of Sputnik has given many people the idea that the Russians suddenly have complete technological superiority over us. This impression is wrong. Though the military implications of Soviet ICBM's are great indeed, technologically, the field of rocketry is only one small section of the whole picture. In many fields of technology and pure science the U.S. is outstandingly strong. This is certainly true in nuclear physics, from the purest scientific aspects to military and economic implications. In pure nuclear physics, the U.S. excels in operating experimental equipment and in experiments carried out, in the theoretical interpretation of experimental results, and in basic theory. In high-energy nuclear physics the Russians are developing fast and may indeed grow to excel. But in low-energy nuclear physics, which is directly related to applications, the strong position of the U.S. is undisputed. The U.S. is also very strong, insofar as this can be known, in

the design and manufacture of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

Other fields in which U.S. science and technology are outstanding are high-speed calculating machines, polymer chemistry and its applications to plastics and synthetic fibers, solid-state physics and its applications to transistors, and many other fields. On the other hand, there are fields in which Russia is pushing rapidly ahead, for example, in oceanography, rocket propulsion, theoretical mathematics, space medicine, and certain phases of electronics.

What Sputnik has shown is not that leadership has passed from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. but that we must expect in the future more instances of Russian challenge to our scientific leadership. Sputnik has shown that the U.S.S.R. is a very serious competitor in the technological field. She has not passed us yet, but she has a strong will to do so.

That such a transition of scientific leadership from one country to another can happen very rapidly was shown by our own experience in comparison with that of Western Europe. In the 1920's, while American applied technology was already well developed, most of the *fundamental* scientific discoveries were made in Western Europe. Most of the great discoveries in physics and chemistry until 1935 were made in Western Europe, especially in England and Germany. In the 1930's and early 40's, the U.S. rose to world preeminence in nearly all fields of pure and applied science and technology. Witness for this is the distribution of Nobel prizes in science, very few of which went to the U.S. before 1930, while more than half were awarded to this country since 1945.

Clearly the problem before us is not our leadership and technological strength today. The challenge we face is the maintenance of this position *tomorrow* against the challenge of the surging technological revolution occurring in other countries.

What are some of the elements of a grand strategy for maintaining our great relative strength in technology?

As we seek to frame a sound national policy for an advancing technology, there are certain things we should *not* do.

We should *not* copy our competition. Our methods and programs should be those best suited

to serve our nation well and to give us the technological strength that reflects and advances our own objectives and ideals. If the United States is to maintain its quality and leadership, its effort should be to surpass itself and not some other nation. It must surpass itself if it is to surpass its competitors. Our aim should be not that of sedulously duplicating the projects and programs of the Soviets, however spectacular they may be. Our aim should be to stick to our own course and to do those things which represent our genius and which will best meet our needs.

In education we should *not* become bemused by numbers. We should not, for example, engage in an academic numbers race with the Soviets. We must not throw quality out the window in order to handle numbers; our shortage today is one of quality as well as numbers. We should not allow the pressure for scientists and engineers to obscure the need for first-rate talent in other fields.

Having noted some of the traps we should avoid, let me emphasize two major requirements which must be met if we are to progress.

Importance of Long-Range Objectives

The first of these requirements to insure a flourishing technology calls for more attention to long-range objectives while we struggle with short-range demands. In industry, government, and education we need a better balance between basic research and applied research and development, between fundamental ideas and hardware or gadgets.

Not only do we need more effort in basic research; we need more continuity of effort in all research. Too much of our research has been *ad hoc*, subject to stops and starts and changing levels of support or short-term financing.

The need for greater emphasis on fundamental research is indicated by current discussions about outer-space technology. Much is being said about the military uses of space vehicles, and indeed this is important. But we also need to be giving attention to the use of space vehicles for basic research. As we prepare to penetrate outer space, we have the exciting opportunity to open a new window on the universe. When we are able to make observations beyond the earth's universe in a wholly new light, as Lloyd Berkner has said, we can drop the "monochromatic vision of the insect" and "see the full glory of the whole range of color that the

universe provides. Our knowledge and comprehension and eventually [our] control of [our] environment will grow accordingly." As we debate the military uses of outer space and the exciting concept of space travel, let us not forget this more fundamental scientific opportunity which lies ahead. We must be willing to adhere to scientific programs even though they may not always produce quick, spectacular results.

Invigorating Science Education

Next in my list of requirements for an advancing technology is the need for a sustained effort to modernize and invigorate science education. Up until now we have done little—save in our best schools, where science is probably taught as well as anywhere in the world. We have been blocked by the argument that, if we strengthened our science education, we might run the risk of weakening something else. It is not that scientists should be educated at the expense of people who might be going into the humanities. Rather, it is that science courses have come to be taught much more poorly in many schools than the humanities and need to be brought up to par. As President Eisenhower has said, we have failed "to give high enough priority to scientific education and to the place of science in our national life."³

To remedy the deficiencies we must do many things, most of which are under widespread discussion and are now reflected in programs proposed at local and national levels. But let me name some others.

First, our colleges and universities should raise their entrance requirements in order to set a higher standard for the secondary schools and to exclude the ill-prepared and incompetent applicants. Particularly should admission requirements be increased in English and mathematics. In this and many other ways we should stress the importance of high performance in our education. At all levels of our society we should cultivate a taste for learning, for scholarship, and all that is excellent in mind and spirit.

Second, we should try to correct some of the strange notions about science.

There is a widespread view, for example, that science is "vocational," that it is "materialistic"

³ *Ibid.*, p. 821.

and "antihumanistic," that it contributes only to the convenience but not to the quality of our society.

It is my own deep conviction that the liberal arts cannot be liberal without including science and that humanism is an indispensable ally of science in a sound scientific education. In the face of the practical responsibilities which rest in science and engineering for our security and our material welfare, it is all too easy for people to conclude that science is inimical to the spiritual ends of life and for them to fail to understand that in reality it is one of man's most powerful and noble means for seeking truth. Scientists have an obligation to make this true character of science better understood, not by an arrogant advocacy of science and technology as the only objective means to increase our understanding and well-being but by the balanced and tolerant presentation of science as one of the powerful means by which man can increase his knowledge and understanding and still remain humble and ennobled before the wonder and the majesty of what he does not understand. As George R. Harrison has eloquently written:

There is no evil, no inhumanity, in the primary task of science, to forward man's love and desire for truth. An increased awareness of truth has often made men uncomfortable, but seldom has it made them less human. Science increases the areas of spiritual contact between man and nature, and between man and other men.

Great scientists and great engineers will most likely come from an environment in which educated men and women are as at home in the sciences as they are in the humanities. If we are to realize the full potential of our industrial society, we must blend both science and humanities into the common humanistic culture of our people.

High Degree of Scientific Literacy

Our progress in technology will be greatly affected by our educational success in still a third area—the achievement of a high degree of scientific literacy among the rank and file of Americans. A man cannot be really educated in a relevant way for modern living unless he has an understanding of science. I do not imply that all of our people should be scientists; far from it. I do emphasize the importance of providing our young people, whether they become scientists or not, with some of the intellectual wealth of

science, some of its excitement and adventure, some of its special vision for interpreting nature—some of the understanding which our citizens should have if they are to deal intelligently with the great issues of our time arising out of science.

Let me give an amusing example of the pitfalls of scientific illiteracy. Many years ago a parson-naturalist became interested in deer flies, which are justly noted for their speed. He made some observations, unhappily colored by innocent enthusiasm, and published his estimate that the deer fly cruises at 800 miles per hour. This estimate was accepted as gospel truth for years. But a few years ago the great chemist, Irving Langmuir, who was also a nature lover, became worried as to whether such a tiny insect could store enough energy or fuel in his body to fly at such a rate. He also perceived that at such speeds the deer fly, like the ballistic missile, would have nose-cone problems because of the heat generated by air friction. Troubled by these questions, he hunted up some deer flies and made careful measurement of their speed. It proved to be about 70 miles per hour.

Despite this correction I am told that a recently published table of flying speeds, circulated to an estimated 50 million readers, reported the male deer fly as cruising at 818 miles per hour, while the female struggled along at 800. Thus a titillating sex angle was introduced which will probably preserve the 800-mile estimate for years to come.

Another and more immediate example of the importance of technological poise and understanding is to be found in our current missile and satellite development and testing programs. There has been a widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the tests. The so-called "failures" of flight-test vehicles, to which so much publicity has been given, are normal occurrences in the development of complex mechanisms, many functions of which can be tested only in flight. A flight test which to a casual observer appears to have been a failure provides a great amount of necessary information to the test crew. We shall continue to have such occasional so-called "failures" as long as we pursue a vigorous search for more advanced missiles.

Science is our new frontier and has all the challenge and excitement of the frontier. It is important that the people of the Nation participate

in the conquest of this frontier and share in the excitement and adventure.

Emphasis on Intellectual Discipline

The fourth area is the need for more emphasis in our society on the value of intellectual discipline and on the importance of content rather than method. In recent years we have been managing to get along in the United States by displaying an attitude of condescension toward hard work in our schools. At this point in the evolution of our schools the highest priorities should be given to better provision for our intellectually gifted young people. We should lay greater stress on the more rigorous teaching of intellectual skills and on higher standards of excellence for both teachers and pupils.

There are several current efforts enlisting some of the ablest scientists in our country to design better high school courses, backed up by new texts and new teaching aids. If carried through fully, these efforts could exert great leverage to elevate standards over the Nation. They hold promise of deepening the teaching of secondary-school science by building into it some of the intellectual rigor and excitement, some of the beauty and humanistic values inherent in modern science, thus making it match the potential of our intellectually competent young minds as well as the unfolding promise of science itself. If real progress could be made toward these ends, the new concepts, methods, and materials might start a pace-setting movement to increase the excellence and challenge of other parts of the high-school curriculum. One can hardly imagine an effort more important or more worthy of really bold and large-scale support than this effort to design special high-school programs at a new level of excellence.

Finally, in speaking of the effect of American attitudes and values on science and education, one cannot fail to ask whether we Americans in our drive to make and acquire things have not been giving too little attention to developing men and ideas. If we are to maintain leadership in this century of science, we must be sure that we devote an adequate amount of our energy and resources to the cultivation of talent and quality and intellectual accomplishment.

In summary: If we fulfill our potential for skill, talent, education, and quality, if we can give full recognition in our national life to the importance

of emphasizing quality and of achieving intellectual preeminence, both for our internal benefit and our external position, there would appear to be no real impediment to our steady technological advance.

With our own American prized pattern of education, with the laboratories and factories and advancing skills and freedom of our industrial society, we may well show the way to a nobler level of living for all men and enhanced freedom and dignity for man, the individual.

Dr. Brode Named Science Adviser to Department of State

The Department of State announced on January 13 (press release 11) the appointment of Dr. Wallace R. Brode as Science Adviser. He was sworn in by Secretary Dulles on that day and immediately assumed his new duties.

Until his present appointment Dr. Brode was Associate Director of the National Bureau of Standards of the U.S. Department of Commerce. His election as president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science was announced in December. He was formerly professor of chemistry at the Ohio State University.

Dr. Brode will advise the Secretary and other Department officers on matters relating to scientific developments which affect foreign policy and will direct the work of science attachés overseas. He was recommended for the position by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, president of the National Academy of Sciences; and Dr. Alan T. Waterman, director of the National Science Foundation.

In addition to strengthening the Office of the Science Adviser by the appointment of Dr. Brode, the Department will augment embassy offices by assignment of science attachés to certain foreign capitals.

Dr. Brode's appointment signals a fresh emphasis on a postwar Department of State function curtailed in 1955 in order that the program might be reviewed and plans made for the future. Reexamination during the past year indicated the growing importance of activities of scientists as a significant element in formulating foreign policy and in carrying on relations with other governments. The new work will therefore be

oriented more closely than before to the objectives of the Department and the Foreign Service. Both the Science Adviser and the science attachés will be responsive to requirements of other government departments that carry on scientific activities abroad, since certain of these activities form parts of the pattern of our foreign relations. Dr. Brode will also keep in close touch with Dr. Killian.

As counterparts overseas of the Science Adviser in Washington, certain science attachés will be appointed to advise and collaborate with political, economic, and other embassy officers on those foreign-relations questions in which scientific considerations play a part. They will also assist other Federal agencies and private groups in carrying out their programs of scientific cooperation abroad, such as those of the National Science Foundation, the International Cooperation Administration, the National Academy of Sciences, etc. Like other members of the Foreign Service, they will keep the Department currently informed of developments significant for international relations.

Commenting on the appointment of Dr. Brode and the responsibility he is to assume, Secretary Dulles said:

I am most gratified that such a distinguished scientist as Dr. Brode has accepted the post of Science Adviser and will apply to a government function the wisdom and skills for which he has long been known in professional and governmental fields. Dr. Brode enjoys the confidence of his colleagues at home, as recognized by his recent election to the presidency of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and commands the respect of scientists and others abroad. His international vision and his dedication to scientific development will be powerful factors in helping to bring the significance of science into the realm of foreign relations and in helping to promote the progress of scientific endeavor throughout the world.

Science attachés will be assigned to several U.S. embassies in Europe and Asia in the near future.

Color Photographs To Be Accepted in Passports

Press release 16 dated January 15

The State Department announced on January 15 that effective February 1, 1958, the Passport Office will accept color photographs in passports.

Black and white photographs will continue to be accepted, with those in color permitted as an alternative.

The action was taken because color provides more accurate identification than black and white and because, with color, illegal substitution is more difficult. Additionally, color photographs can be more appealing to the individual traveler.

The introduction of color photographs was made possible because of new color-photograph processes which eliminate fading and deterioration of pictures. The United States is the first nation to introduce color photographs in passports.

The same specifications regarding the size and background as are now required for black and white passport photographs will apply to color. In addition, the color photograph must be printed on a paper base, with the print capable of withstanding a mounting temperature from 180° to 200° F. Black and white prints which have been colored will not be acceptable.

The decision to accept color photographs was announced by Frances G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office, at the 11th Annual Travel Forum being held at Wilmington, Del. It is part of a program of improving passport procedures. In making the announcement, Miss Knight said:

"Last year I engaged in a personal campaign to improve the appearance of passport pictures. I asked for the cooperation of all photographers who take passport pictures to help applicants relax and put their best face forward. In the past year we have noted some improvement. People are beginning to demand better passport pictures, and with public demand will come even greater improvement.

"For many months now, we have been looking into the feasibility of accepting color photographs for use in passports. I am very happy to say that recent advancement in color photography has produced color pictures which meet our requirements to withstand heat and moisture. They have also acquired permanence. As of February 1, the Passport Office will accept color photographs as well as black and white pictures which meet our specifications as to size, pose, and finish. The requirements are the same for both color pictures and black and white pictures."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During January 1958

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 6th Session . . .	Bangkok	Jan. 6-13
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance . . .	Geneva	Jan. 6-14
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 6th Meeting	Geneva	Jan. 9-10
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Jan. 13-21
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 1st Meeting	Washington	Jan. 13-17
UNREF Executive Committee: 7th Session	Geneva	Jan. 13-17
WHO Executive Board: 21st Session	Geneva	Jan. 14-21
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 1st Session	Bangkok	Jan. 20-27
4th ICAO European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Meeting: Preliminary Meeting of Air Traffic Services Com- mittee.	Geneva	Jan. 21-27
Baghdad Pact Council: 4th Meeting	Ankara	Jan. 27-30

In Session as of January 31, 1958

U.N. ECOSOC Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimina- tion and Protection of Minorities: 10th Session.	New York	Jan. 13-
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 2d Session	New Delhi	Jan. 21-
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation	New York	Jan. 27-
4th ICAO European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Geneva	Jan. 28-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 21st Session	New York	Jan. 30-

Scheduled February 1-April 30, 1958

ICEM Working Group	Washington	Feb. 3-
ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Feb. 10-
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: 10th Annual Meeting.	Panamá	Feb. 11-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 7th Session	Bangkok	Feb. 11-
PAIGH: 8th Pan American Consultation on Cartography	Habana	Feb. 12-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Group of Experts on Rice Grading and Standardization, Consultative Sub- committee on Rice.	Washington	Feb. 12-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 2d Meeting of Con- sultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Washington	Feb. 17-
ICAO/WMO Special Joint Meteorological Telecommunications Meeting for Europe.	Geneva	Feb. 24-
2d Central American and Caribbean Bibliographic Seminar	Panamá	Feb. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 1st Session.	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya . .	Feb. 24-
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea	Geneva	Feb. 24-
ILO Governing Body: 138th Session (and Committees)	Geneva	Feb. 26-
PAIGH: 5th Pan American Consultation on Geography	Quito	February*
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Ex- perts on Tourist Travel Promotion.	México, D. F	February*
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Ex- perts on Travel Plant.	Washington	February
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Ex- perts on Research and Organization.	Lima	February
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Ex- perts on the Removal of Travel Barriers.	Buenos Aires	February
ICAO Map Panel: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Mar. 3-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 16, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled February 1–April 30, 1958—Continued

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . . .	New York	Mar. 3–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 3–
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 14th Session.	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya . . .	Mar. 5–
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 3d Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Santiago	Mar. 10–
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Mar. 10–
SEATO: 4th Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Manila	Mar. 10–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session. . .	New York	Mar. 10–
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Short-Term Indicators.	Geneva	Mar. 10–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women: 12th Session.	Geneva	Mar. 17–
ICAO Conference on Charges for Route Air Navigation Facilities and Services.	Montreal	Mar. 18–
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 6th Meeting.	Santiago	Mar. 19–
WMO Regional Association IV (North and Central America): 2d Session.	Habana	Mar. 19–
Inter-Parliamentary Union: Council Meeting.	Geneva	Mar. 24–
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee.	Habana	March*
International Sugar Council: 15th Session	London	March
ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Division: Search and Rescue Division (RAC/SAR) Meeting.	Montreal	Apr. 9–
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 13th Session	Geneva	Apr. 9–
WMO: Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 2d Session. .	Manila	Apr. 14–
ILO Textiles Committee: 6th Session	Geneva	Apr. 14–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 25th Session	New York	Apr. 15–
Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958	Brussels	Apr. 17–
UNESCO Executive Board: 50th Session	Paris	Apr. 21–
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 10th Session	New York	Apr. 28–*
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 13th Session . .	Geneva	Apr. 28–
ILO International Labor Conference: 41st (Maritime) Session . .	(undetermined)	Apr. 29–
WMO Executive Committee: 10th Session	Geneva	Apr. 29–
4th FAO Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology	Madrid	April

Nongovernmental Advisers Report on 12th Session of the GATT

Following is the text of a report made to President Eisenhower on December 17 by the nongovernmental advisers to the U.S. delegation to the 12th session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.¹

The public advisers to the just concluded Twelfth Session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Geneva were strongly impressed by the following:

First, the real value of international trade to the United States economy.

Second, the demonstrated practicality of GATT as the means of continuing the reduction and removal of obstacles to the expansion of American exports.

Third, the activities of the American delegation

in the interests of our businessmen, workers, and farmers.

Fourth, expansion of two-way international trade is essential for the strength and viability of the free world. Our security and prosperity cannot exist in economic isolation.

The public advisers note that the 10-year accomplishments of GATT are truly remarkable, particularly in the light of the fact that it is fundamentally only a trade agreement without provision for an organization. It has provided a basis for intergovernmental consultation and negotiation in response to a felt need, not a theoretical formula.

The European Common Market was the major agenda item of the Twelfth Session. The importance of this session was emphasized by the fact that most countries sent representatives of cabinet or ministerial rank. GATT demonstrated its usefulness in providing a workmanlike forum to explore the provisions of the Rome Treaty, establishing the Common Market, with due regard to the applicable provisions of the GATT and the

¹ For an announcement of the full delegation, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1957, p. 768. For a review of the 12th session, see *ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1957, p. 1004.

greatest possible satisfaction of all Contracting Parties. Our objective was to ensure that the integration movement continue to develop and come into early existence and at the same time to guard the interests of the United States and other outside countries. We were convinced that the Common Market will lead to a union which will assure in the future highly desirable and indissoluble political relationships. The free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital will surely strengthen the ties between the six nations making for a more stable and dynamic European community.

GATT procedures will provide the means for the United States and all other countries with export markets in the Common Market area to press for the lowest possible level of the new common tariffs of the Six. In the interest of United States industry, labor and agriculture it is vital we fully exercise our influence in GATT to attain this objective.

Unfortunately, the influence of the United States was and is not as great as it should be. Uncertainty about the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and our continuing failure to approve the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) has reduced the general as well as the specific influence of the United States upon the other GATT countries, whether in negotiations seeking removal of quantitative restrictions, holding down Common Market tariffs or otherwise furthering United States interests.

We need a forcefully articulated and fully implemented trade program. We believe that it is an essential part of our foreign policy that Congress in 1958 renew the Trade Agreements Act for at least five years with authority to make meaningful reductions in existing tariff rates.² The renewal should include existing safeguards for industry and agriculture with no diminution

of the President's authority and with due regard for the legitimate concerns of labor. We also recommend the approval of our membership in OTC.³

It was apparent at Geneva that without GATT it would not be possible to obtain critical review of quantitative restrictions imposed for balance of payments reasons but no longer justified. The United States originated this important procedure in 1956.⁴ Through GATT foreign import quotas against American goods in many categories have been eliminated.

The deficiencies of the present system of transacting GATT business without the machinery which the OTC would provide, were constantly apparent at the Twelfth Session.

First, the settlement of some of the issues lagged considerably because of the need to await the convening of a session held for only a few weeks once a year.

Second, the important work of this annual session was burdened by highly technical or routine matters which could more properly have been dealt with by a year-round permanent organization with adequate staff.

Third, there are instances in which American exporters are handicapped because there is no machinery available to settle controversies that develop between annual sessions of the GATT, and the delay that ensues may be very serious in its impact. The existence of OTC would expedite settlement of such questions.

The United States would be acting in its self-interest if it would ratify OTC and put into operation this important machinery.

In conclusion the non-governmental advisors wish to go on record that they were deeply impressed by the conscientious competence and effectiveness of the career men of the United States delegation, representing Government agencies and departments.

ANDREW J. BIEMILLER

Director, Legislation Department, AFL-CIO

ARTHUR B. EVANS

Member, National Agricultural Advisory Council

H. J. HEINZ II, *President, H. J. Heinz Company*

² For an outline of administration proposals for renewing the Trade Agreements Act, see *ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1957, p. 1042.

³ For a message to Congress by President Eisenhower, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1957, p. 657.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1956, p. 683, and Dec. 3, 1956, p. 893.

Radioisotopes in Scientific Research

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RADIOISOTOPES IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
PARIS, SEPTEMBER 9-20, 1957

by George G. Manov

Background

The International Conference on Radioisotopes in Scientific Research sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was a logical followup of the first United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1955.¹ This conference, in turn, was the implementation of the speech delivered by President Eisenhower before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953.²

This 1957 conference was specifically limited to the presentation of research uses of radioisotopes and therefore had a more limited coverage.

At the ninth session of the General Conference of UNESCO, held at New Delhi, India, November 5 to December 5, 1956,³ there was adopted a resolution 2.32 (paragraph 5) which authorized the Director General of UNESCO, Luther H. Evans,

... to assist scientific collaboration in connection with the peaceful utilization of atomic energy by organizing international conferences and seminars and exchanges of scientists working for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy in all branches of science; by encouraging the publication of appropriate literature; and by employing other means to ensure that such collaboration continues to develop in the years to come.

Additional conferences dealing with the use of radioisotopes have been held, particularly in 1954

at Oxford, England, organized by the Harwell Laboratory of the U.K. Atomic Energy Research Establishment, and have pointed up the outstanding advances in the application of this new research tool.

In consultation with the Secretariat of the United Nations, UNESCO convened a group of consultants for the purpose of calling a special conference on the use of radioisotopes in scientific research and for delineating the boundaries thereto.

The subjects to be dealt with at the conference, as well as the other organizational details, were settled with the aid of a group of consultants who met in UNESCO House on January 14 and 15, 1957. The group consisted of the following: C. D. Coryell (United States), C. Fisher (France), F. M. Gomes (Brazil), T. Hamada (Japan), C. Jech (Czechoslovakia), A. S. Rao (India), I. D. Rojansky (U.S.S.R.), H. Seligman (United Kingdom), and V. S. Vavilov (U.S.S.R.), as well as representatives of the following organizations: the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (R. A. Silow), the World Health Organization (I. S.

• Mr. Manov, author of the above article, is technical assistant to Willard F. Libby, Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and was an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the International Conference on Radioisotopes in Scientific Research.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1955, p. 243; Aug. 22, 1955, p. 300; Sept. 5, 1955, p. 381; Oct. 10, 1955, p. 555.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1957, p. 72.

Eve), the World Meteorological Organization (P. J. Meade), and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (A. Lundby). Later, Cyril L. Comar was added as a consultant from the World Health Organization.

According to the instructions issued by the Director General of UNESCO:

The International Conference on Radioisotopes in Scientific Research will be strictly scientific in character. Its purpose is to bring together, from all over the world, a large number of specialists in the various scientific disciplines interested in the use of radioisotopes, and to enable them to submit the results of their research and to exchange information and views on a series of subjects in which developments are proceeding at a particularly rapid pace. The Conference will therefore be primarily devoted to the presentation and discussion of scientific papers dealing with original research, and will not be empowered to adopt resolutions or make recommendations.

It was agreed that the conference would be held at Paris, France, September 9 to 20, 1957.

On May 6, 1957, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was formally requested by the Department of State to nominate persons to serve on an official delegation to represent the U.S. Government at the UNESCO conference. It was also learned at this time that UNESCO planned to defer to the IAEA sponsorship of future conferences on radioisotopes.

The AEC, in response to the request from the

Department of State, proposed a delegation to represent the United States at the UNESCO conference and to assist 15 selected participants in submitting their papers for review by UNESCO. A working committee consisting of George G. Manov, Technical Assistant to Commissioner Willard F. Libby; Raymond Edwards, Division of International Affairs; Paul Pearson, Division of Biology and Medicine; and Raymond Jones, Division of Research, was appointed to assist the Office of Special Projects in coordinating the AEC effort to participate in the conference. It was determined that an official delegation and 10 scientists employed by the AEC or AEC contractors would represent the United States at Paris. This number was later increased to 15 to assure top U.S. scientific participation at each session of the conference. Willard F. Libby was named the U.S. Representative, Raymond Edwards, Alternate Representative, and George G. Manov and John W. Irvine, Jr., were named advisers.

In the latter part of May, the AEC was requested to examine a proposal from UNESCO to the Department of State for a U.S. exhibit at the conference. It was determined that, because of space limitations and lack of new or unusual instruments, as well as the cost of designing, constructing, and operating such an exhibit, the United States would not participate in this regard.

TABLE I—AGENDA

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Session</i>	<i>Physical sciences</i>	<i>Session</i>	<i>Biological sciences</i>
Sept. 9	A. M.	1	Opening of conference	1	Opening of conference
	P. M.	2A	Production of radioisotopes I	2B	Pharmacology
Sept. 10	A. M.	3A'	Production of radioisotopes II	3B	Thyroid; iodine metabolism
	A. M.	3A''	Dosimetry		
	P. M.	4A	Design and use of strong sources	4B	Lipid metabolism
Sept. 11	A. M.	5A	Physics of metals	5B	Blood and blood proteins
	P. M.	6A	Metallurgy	6B	Nucleic acids
Sept. 12	A. M.	7A	Industrial applications	7B	Protein and aminoacid metabolism
	P. M.	8A	Solid state physics I	8B	Metabolism in brain and nervous system
Sept. 13	A. M.	9A'	Solid state physics II	9B	Clinical physiology—reproduction
	A. M.	9A''	Organic chemistry I		
	P. M.	10A	Organic chemistry II	10B	Mineral metabolism I
Sept. 16	A. M.	11A	Recoil chemistry	11B	Mineral metabolism II
	P. M.	12A	Analytical chemistry I	12B	Fission products; metabolism in soils, plants, and mammals
Sept. 17	A. M.	13	Methods and techniques I	13	Methods and techniques I
	P. M.	14	Methods and techniques II	14	Methods and techniques II
Sept. 18	A. M.	15A'	Analytical chemistry II	15B	Nutrient assimilation in plants
	A. M.	15A''	Physical chemistry I		
	P. M.	16A	Physical chemistry II	16B	Translocation in plants
Sept. 19	A. M.	17	Physical chemistry III	17B	Photosynthesis
	P. M.	18A	Geophysics I	18B	Plant biosynthesis
Sept. 20	A. M.	19A	Geophysics II	19B	Plant metabolism
	P. M.	20A	Parity problems in physics	20B	Productivity of oceans and lakes

Agenda

The conference was divided into two major parts, one dealing with the physical sciences, the other with the biological sciences. Both sessions were operated concurrently and met in a joint session for the opening ceremony and for various plenary sessions. In addition, there were evening talks on a variety of subjects.

The agenda is given in table I; the evening talks are listed in table II.

TABLE II—EVENING LECTURES

- Sept. 10----- 1. "The General Problem of the New Permissible Levels of Radiation," Lauriston S. Taylor, chief, Atomic and Radiation Physics Division, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D. C.
2. "Problems of Waste Disposal in the Large-scale Use of Radioisotopes," W. G. Marley, head, Health Physics Division, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Establishment, Harwell, England.
- Sept. 11----- 3. "The Use of Atomic Energy in Industry and Chemistry," Henry Seligman, head, Isotopes Division, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Establishment, Harwell, England.
- Sept. 12----- 4. "The Future of Atomic Energy," Sir John Cockcroft, director, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Establishment, Harwell, England.
- Sept. 16----- 5. "L'utilisation diagnostique des isotopes en médecine," le professeur René Fauvert, de l'Université de Paris.
6. "L'utilisation thérapeutique des isotopes en médecine," le professeur M. Tubiana, Chef du Laboratoire des Isotopes et du Betatron de l'Institut Gustave Roussy, Paris.
- Sept. 17----- 7. "The Significance of Atomic Energy for Agriculture and Food Production," R. A. Silow, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
8. "Economic Benefits of the Use of Radioisotopes," Willard F. Libby, United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.
- Sept. 18----- 9 and 10. "Experimental Studies of Calcium and Strontium Movement from Soil to Man," Cyril L. Comar, chief, Biomedical Research, Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, U. S. A., and Professor R. Scott Russel, University of Oxford, U. K.
- Sept. 19----- 11. "La composition isotopique de l'écorce terrestre et des météorites," le professeur A. P. Vinogradov, Institut V. J. Vernadsky de Géochimie et de Chimie analytique de l'Académie des Sciences de l'U. R. S. S.
12. "La méthode des molécules marquées et le problème de la photosynthèse," le professeur A. A. Nichiporovich, de l'Académie des Sciences de l'U. R. S. S.

In addition to the above, three special seminars were organized as follows:

- Sept. 13----- 1. "Production of Radioisotopes."
- Sept. 17----- 2. "Permissible Limits of Radioisotopes in Industrial Goods."
- Sept. 20----- 3. "Symposium on Geochemistry."

A formal, final plenary session was held under the chairmanship of Sir John Cockcroft (U.K.) on September 17.

Participation

Sixty countries and 25 international organizations were represented at the conference; 113 American scientists attended.

The United States delegation consisted of:

Chairman

Willard F. Libby, Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Alternate

Raymond R. Edwards, Department of Chemistry, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.

Advisers

George G. Manov, technical assistant to Willard F. Libby, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

John W. Irvine, Jr., Department of Chemistry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.; on loan to Office of Naval Research, London, England

Max Isenbergh, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, U.S. Department of State, American Embassy, Paris, France

Henry J. Kellermann, Special Counselor for UNESCO Affairs, American Embassy, Paris, France

Rules of procedure of the conference were those appropriate to a scientific meeting. Rule 11, entitled, "Proposals," was explicit in stating that:

No proposals requiring adoption by voting shall be submitted or entertained by the Conference. The presiding officer of any meeting may, however, ascertain the sense of the meeting on matters not relating to the substance of an item on the agenda.

Conclusions

The conference was effective scientifically, with well over 1,000 in attendance and many new papers presented. It was surprising how much new material had been generated since the Geneva conference 2 years before.

The U.S. delegation recommends continued, active support and participation in conferences of this nature. Radioisotopes promise to yield many benefits to human welfare in the broadest sense.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the annexes and to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955.¹

Declaration deposited recognizing signature as fully binding: Turkey, October 23, 1957.

Acceptance: Nicaragua, October 26, 1956.

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signatures: Ceylon, October 30, 1957; Sweden, October 31, 1957; Finland, November 2, 1957.

Acceptances deposited: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, October 21, 1957; Turkey, October 23, 1957.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Signatures: Turkey, October 18, 1957; Ceylon, October 30, 1957.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signatures: Turkey, October 18, 1957; Ceylon, October 30, 1957; Sweden, October 31, 1957.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Signatures: Turkey, October 18, 1957; Ceylon, October 30, 1957.

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, October 25, 1957.

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, the

¹ Not in force.

² Partially in force, section B of the procès verbal having entered into force on Oct. 7, 1957, as a result of the entry into force on that date of the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement.

protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III, and the protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.²

Signatures: Turkey, October 18, 1957; Ceylon, October 30, 1957; Sweden, October 31, 1957.

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Schedule of concessions entered into force: Chile, July 1, 1956.

Signature: Ceylon, October 30, 1957.

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Signatures: United Kingdom, October 18, 1957; Austria, October 23, 1957; Luxembourg, October 29, 1957; Ceylon, October 30, 1957; Pakistan, November 2, 1957; New Zealand, November 25, 1957; Indonesia, November 29, 1957; Australia, December 11, 1957.

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and the United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 3882.

Signature: Austria, November 30, 1957.

BILATERAL

Ethiopia

Agreement relating to a special program of facilities assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa December 26, 1957. Entered into force December 26, 1957.

Yugoslavia

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of November 3, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3688, 3735, and 3785). Signed at Belgrade December 27, 1957. Entered into force December 27, 1957.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Richard C. Breithut as Deputy Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs, effective December 15.

Jack A. Herfurt as Deputy Executive Director, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, effective December 30.

Merrill M. Hammond as Director, Office of Munitions Control, effective January 13.

American Republics. Communism in the Americas (Rubottom)	180
Atomic Energy. Radi isotopes in Scientific Research (Manov)	195
Canada. Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration (text of proclamation)	179
China, Communist. The Role of Negotiation (Dulles)	159
Communism	
Communism in the Americas (Rubottom)	180
The Role of Negotiation (Dulles)	159
Congress, The. Budget Message of the President (excerpts)	169
Department and Foreign Service	
Dr. Brode Named Science Adviser to Department of State	190
Color Photographs To Be Accepted in Passports	191
Designations (Breithut, Herfurt, Hammond)	198
Economic Affairs	
Budget Message of the President (excerpts)	169
Communism in the Americas (Rubottom)	180
Nongovernmental Advisers Report on 12th Session of the GATT	193
Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration (text of proclamation)	179
International Organizations and Conferences	
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings	192
Nongovernmental Advisers Report on 12th Session of the GATT	193
Radi isotopes in Scientific Research (Manov)	195
Laos. United States and Laos Reaffirm Friendly Ties (Eisenhower, Souvanna Phouma)	168
Military Affairs. Budget Message of the President (excerpts)	169
Mutual Security	
Budget Message of the President (excerpts)	169
United States and Laos Reaffirm Friendly Ties (Eisenhower, Souvanna Phouma)	168
Presidential Documents	
Budget Message of the President (excerpts)	169
Saint Lawrence Seaway Celebration	179

Science	
Dr. Brode Named Science Adviser to Department of State	190
Maintaining the Technological Strength of the United States (Killian)	186
Radi isotopes in Scientific Research (Manov)	195
Treaty Information. Current Actions	198
U.S.S.R.	
Communism in the Americas (Rubottom)	180
Maintaining the Technological Strength of the United States (Killian)	186
The Role of Negotiation (Dulles)	159

Name Index

Breithut, Richard C.	198
Brode, Wallace R.	190
Dulles, Secretary	159, 190
Eisenhower, President	168, 169, 179
Grant, Ben	159
Hammond, Merrill M.	198
Herfurt, Jack A.	198
Killian, James R., Jr.	186
Manov, George G.	195
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr.	180
Souvanna Phouma, Prince	168

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 13-19

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
10	1/13	Rubottom: "Communism in the Americas."
11	1/13	Brode appointed science adviser (rewrite).
†12	1/14	Advisory Committee on Arts (rewrite).
*13	1/14	Educational exchange.
14	1/15	U.S.-Laos communique.
†15	1/16	Economic assistance to India.
16	1/15	Color photographs on passports.
†17	1/18	Further assistance to IAEA.
18	1/16	Dulles: "The Role of Negotiation."
19	1/16	Dulles: Questions and answers, Press Club.
†20	1/16	Advisory Committee on Arts.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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